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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
 
A Decade of Hell: How Repression and Violence Shaped Local 22’s Shift to Oligarchy 
 
 
 
by 
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Professor Abigail Andrews, Chair 
  
 
 This investigation examines a teachers’ local (local 22 of the National Union of 
Education Workers of Mexico (SNTE)) in the Mexican state of Oaxaca and the effects of 
repression on the oligarchization of local 22. Using sociologist Robert Michels’ theory of 
oligarchization known as the “iron law of oligarchy”—which claims that any democratic 
organization that becomes large enough to bureaucratize will inevitably become an oligarchy—
as a framework, this investigation makes the argument that external influences, specifically 
government repression, can force an organization to become oligarchic, thus occupying an 
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important, yet unexplored space within the “iron law” theory. Michels’ theory focuses on an 
organizations’ internal issues such as bureaucratization, centralization of power, and technical 
specialization of job positions as the factors that push an organization to become oligarchic 
without accounting for external issues faced by organizations that can also influence a shift to 
oligarchy. Through historical research, interviews of local 22 members, and observations carried 
out in Oaxaca City this investigation argues that intense government repression and violence 
against local 22 beginning in 2006 and continuing for the next ten years significantly affected 
local 22’s shift toward oligarchy, more so than the bureaucratization and centralization that took 
place within the local. 
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Introduction: A Failed Movement, Punishing Repercussions, and Oligarchy 
  
In Oaxaca City the warning calls had been coming in throughout the day and well into the 
night of June 13 and 14, 2006. Radio Universidad, the university run radio station on the campus 
of Benito Juarez Autonomous University of Oaxaca (UABJO), had acted as the broadcasting site 
for the teachers of local 22, one of the largest teacher locals in Mexico, who used the airwaves to 
broadcast protest propaganda and warn other protestors throughout the city about possible danger 
and confrontations with the police. Reports spread that the police were planning an assault on the 
protesting teachers gathered in the city center. The protesters were on edge; the tension was 
palpable, and as the night of June 13 dragged on the protesters nervously waited, many hoping 
that the reports coming in on Radio Universidad were nothing more than unsubstantiated rumors. 
The teachers had occupied the zócalo since May 22 attempting to pressure the government to 
cede to their demands of higher pay, improved housing options, scholarships, and school 
materials for students (Stephen, 2013). 2006 was not unlike any other year for the teachers of 
local 22. The annual protest and sit-in in the zócalo had essentially become a tradition with the 
government usually making the necessary concessions to get the teachers back to their homes.  
But in the early morning hours of June 14, thousands of teachers from the local 22 of the 
National Union of Education Workers (SNTE) occupying Oaxaca City’s main square, or zócalo 
as it is locally known, arose to the vibrating pulse of helicopter rotor blades and the arrival of 
hundreds of police forces that had been sent in by Governor Ulises Ruiz Ortiz to forcibly evict 
them. What ensued over the next few hours could only be described as nothing less than a 
warzone. In the dark of night, under canopies of sprawling Indian Laurels that dot the city center, 
the police funneled their way into the zócalo, and in an act of violence that caught the teachers 
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off guard, laid siege to the encampment. From the circling helicopter above, tear gas rained down 
on the flustered teachers, and police on foot shot tear gas and pepper spray into the escaping 
crowds, extinguishing any hope of respite from the toxic gases. No one was spared, not even the 
children who were staying with their striking mothers or fathers or the elderly who were 
unwittingly caught up in in the violence (Daria & Santamaría, 2006). Within hours the teachers 
were gone and their encampment completely destroyed. A couple of blocks from the zócalo, 
police had breached the headquarters of local 22 and arrested various leaders of the local and 
destroyed the radio station that the teachers had been using as a propaganda machine and as 
information relay to the protesters regarding police activity in the city (Velez & Mendez, 2006). 
By dawn, the sun’s rays illuminated the only remaining vestiges of what the striking teachers had 
called theirs. Tattered tarps and tents, rising smoke from the smoldering remains, and scattered 
belongings littered throughout the zócalo and the neighboring alameda and streets. 
 The government victory, however, would be short-lived. Blocks away from the zócalo 
the teachers regrouped, this time with the reinforcements of hundreds of sympathetic citizens. 
Attempting to prevent police reinforcements from arriving, the teachers began to commandeer 
buses and anything else they could use to construct barricades throughout the downtown area. 
Soon, fire and thick smoke sprang up as teachers and citizens set buses and tires ablaze and 
kindled the fires with whatever they could find. At approximately 10:00 a.m. and armed with 
what they could use as weapons—rocks, sticks, debris, makeshift Molotov cocktails—the 
teachers re-entered the zócalo and engaged with the police (Ortega, 2009). Outnumbered and 
unwilling to fight back, the police forces retreated from the zócalo and would not return. The 
teachers scored a major moral victory and one that would lead to the teachers’ occupation of the 
city for the next six months. 
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 Re-taking the zócalo and having police forces withdraw their positions infused a new 
sense of valor and renewed hope for the teachers and others participating in the resistance. So 
much so, in fact, that just a few days after the conflict in the zócalo, the Popular Assembly of the 
Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO) was formally created. APPO itself consisted of a coalition of people 
and organizations especially from local 22 and different NGO’s. Collectively, APPO pushed for 
the resignation of Governor Ruiz—who was a member of the hegemonic Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI)—who many in Oaxaca viewed as oppressive, corrupt, and fascist, by 
organizing mass protests and civil disobedience (Martinez Gonzalez & Valle Baeza, 2007). The 
formation of APPO resulted from a set of disparate factors that aligned in a perfect storm type of 
situation with local 22 being one of the principle factors. For one, resistance from local 22 had 
intensified to new heights. Since May 1, when the local presented the state government with its 
grievances, its protest activity had been high and much more aggressive. The teachers blocked 
access to the Oaxaca International Airport allowing no one to enter or exit, and they later 
blockaded the highways leading into Oaxaca City (Cronología del conflicto, 2006). Additionally, 
large-scale marches and sit-ins had already been taking place before the conflict in the zócalo in 
June. And other unions, such as the Mexican Electrical Union (SME), sent semi-trailers full of 
supplies and food as a token of solidarity with the teachers (Rafael, personal communication, 
June 29, 2017).  
Locally and nationally, public sentiment toward the government had been waning due to 
accusations of corruption and violence especially in the wake of President Felipe Calderón’s 
defeat of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in the presidential election by half a percentage point. 
The razor thin victory by Calderón had many in Mexico and abroad pointing to corruption and 
election fraud (Collins & Holland, 2006; Levin & Alvarez, 2009). Furthermore, instances of 
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government repression against citizens had exacerbated an already tenuous relationship between 
the two. In May 2006 in the municipality of San Salvador Atenco, in Mexico State, for example, 
police forces were summoned by then Governor Enrique Peña Nieto to forcibly remove flower 
vendors, most of whom were women, from a market. Outraged by the violent actions of the 
police to evict the vendors, thousands of citizens rioted in Atenco leading to a violent 
confrontation with police in which at least two protesters were killed, several women beaten and 
raped, and hundreds arrested (Gilly, 2006; Olivares, 2017). Confrontations, such as the one that 
took place in Atenco, heightened the public’s distrust of elected leaders and law enforcement. 
Nowhere was this distrust and animosity more palpable than in Oaxaca. In Oaxaca, like the 
events in Atenco, the days following the initial repression in the zócalo were filled with 
widespread accusations of torture and rape committed by the police against the protestors. 
Teachers, allied citizens, and bystanders who were in the zócalo at the time recounted this 
violence that came so soon after Atenco. The events from Atenco which took place a little over a 
month before the conflict in Oaxaca began became a symbol of the struggle that local 22 and 
others embraced, and from June until November teachers and their allies maintained the struggle 
and successfully took control of the entire city, with Governor Ruiz and other state and local 
government officials nowhere to be found. 
The success that local 22 enjoyed in 2006 seemed to suggest that the political and social 
landscape of Oaxaca was on the verge of change. Not only did the teachers’ union assume 
control of Oaxaca for nearly six months, but they did it with an unprecedented amount of help 
and support from citizens, NGOs, students, organizations, and other unions. This victory 
showcased the enormous amounts of success local 22 had in bringing a movement together, but 
more significantly, it showed that a participatory democracy could exist alongside and triumph 
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over the corporatist, oppressive, and dictatorial political hegemony of Mexico. In 2010, for 
example, a non-PRI governor was elected for the first time in eighty years and other local 
elections throughout the state saw the defeat of PRI party candidates (Eisenstadt, 2011). 
Grassroots movements soon sprouted up throughout the state and indigenous rights 
became an integral part of the movement for social justice. Protests and blockades from Oaxaca 
City to the Isthmus region of the state became commonplace. But the success and momentum of 
2006 would not last long. By 2016, merely ten years after what seemed to be its pinnacle of 
influence, local 22 found itself on the verge of what appeared to be an existential crisis with 
many teachers defecting from the local only to criticize the union and call off their allegiance to 
its leaders. When during the height of local 22’s influence mega-marches of tens of thousands of 
teachers would suffocate Oaxaca’s avenues and downtown and bring large swaths of the city to a 
standstill, 2016 would see the local barely mustering a few thousand teachers to march in protest 
even after multiple protestors were killed by police at a protest and roadblock put on by local 22 
in Nochixtlán. 2016 appeared to be the antithesis to 2006 for local 22, where in 2006 solidarity 
among the teachers was strong and investment in the movement was high and in 2016 there was 
a more general feeling of apathy and resignation. Furthermore, local 22’s public image suffered, 
partly as a result of an aggressive media campaign by the government to smear the local, and 
partly as a result of the failed movement of 2006 that left many disillusioned. These observations 
invite new questions to be asked. For example, how could local 22, which seemed to be at the 
pinnacle of power, influence, and popular approval in 2006, seem to be on the verge of collapse 
in 2016? How could the rank and file, which historically has been extremely active and invested 
in nonconformity and government resistance, appear so apathetic and disinterested in pushing 
forward local 22’s agenda? 
6 
 
The Role of Oligarchy Within Local 22 and General Overview of Thesis 
 The sociologist Robert Michels argued that any growing democratic organization 
inevitably converts into an oligarchy. In fact, he went so far to declare this phenomenon an “iron 
law” (1962). To support his theory, Michels argued that as an organization grows it will have to 
bureaucratize, that is, it will have to create new positions and offices within the organization to 
carry out the daily administrative activities required to run the organization. Specialization soon 
follows, where specific administrative positions are created and filled by hired employees and 
centralization of power comes as a result of the leadership’s increased desire to remain in their 
positions of power and prioritization of their own interests over those of the general membership. 
Furthermore, as membership grows the practice of creating delegates that represent those 
members is instituted, thereby eliminating the practice of true participatory democracy and 
drastically limiting the rank and file’s ability to participate in decisions affecting the 
organization. Using Michels’ theory of oligarchy, this paper defines oligarchy as an organization 
that contains a small cohort of elites or leaders that exercise decision-making power over the 
organization. As such I will apply this definition of oligarchy to local 22 in that a small group of 
leaders within the local wield control over administrative and tactical issues related to the daily 
tasks and general trajectory of the local. 
 This paper explores local 22’s shift from participatory democracy to oligarchy with 
special emphasis on the role government repression had in pushing local 22 toward more 
centralized control, attenuating the efficacy of democracy practiced by the rank and file and 
severely debilitating the local. Local 22 displays the characteristics Michels lays out in his theory 
of oligarchization such as bureaucratization, specialization, and centralization of power, yet in 
this paper these characteristics are not scrutinized to the degree repression is. One important note 
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regarding Michels’ theory of oligarchization is the focus on the internal factors that push an 
organization toward oligarchy. A growing bureaucracy, centralization of power, and 
specialization highlight the internal changes taking place as an organization makes the transition 
to oligarchy. While I do not dismiss those internal factors and agree that they have contributed to 
the oligarchization of local 22, I look at how the external factor of government repression 
accelerated the shift. Throughout the paper a reference to internal and external forces will be 
used to reference the factors mentioned above. As will be explored in more detail, the data 
obtained from my interviews suggests that repression was more of the driving force behind the 
oligarchization of the local and to a lesser degree bureaucratization, specialization, and 
centralization.       
 
Research Question 
 When I first arrived in Oaxaca in February 2007 all that was left were the vestiges of the 
conflict from the prior year. Abandoned and severely dilapidated barricades remained scattered 
throughout the city occupying street corners near downtown and extending out to the peripheries 
of the city limits. Graffiti sprayed across walls from churches to businesses, especially near the 
city center, communicated the tension and anger that was felt by many. One of the more 
memorable images painted was that of the Virgin Guadalupe. In the image she is depicted in the 
traditional action of praying except that she does so wearing a gas mask invoking what had been 
a central theme of the 2006 conflict—protesters being attacked with tear gas. 
 For the next four years as I lived in Oaxaca I noticed that local 22 continued to lose 
influence. People were more critical of the local and more vocal in their opposition to what the 
teachers were doing. APPO seemed to disappear, and Governor Ortiz peacefully finished his 
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term in office. The energy that was palpable in 2006 had been deflated and it seemed as if the 
momentum had reversed course. The years following continued with the same trend. I visited 
Oaxaca every year and noticed that local 22 continued to be active in its annual demands and 
protests, yet they lacked the participant vigor and dedication from years prior. On one occasion 
as I was riding in a bus near the city center a group of teachers boarded and subsequently 
commandeered it to use it as a barricade nearby. All of us passengers calmly exited the bus after 
the teachers politely told us what they were doing. Yet, what stood out to me during this 
experience was the liberty with which a few of the passengers began to criticize and verbally 
confront the teachers on the bus. It seemed as if the mutual relationship between the local and the 
citizens that had been so visible in 2006 had been severed. Notwithstanding, local 22 protested 
and marched and claimed its familiar spot in the zócalo year after year, yet it seemed that few 
were invested including many of the teachers. As I would visit the zócalo every summer during 
the sit-ins I noticed that the number of teachers present diminished. Even in 2016, days after at 
least seven protesters were killed and scores of teachers injured in Nochixtlán by federal police, 
the zócalo was sparsely occupied by teachers demanding justice for the violence, a far cry from 
the thousands that converged there after the violent removal of teachers in 2006. 
 The zócalo historically has acted as the main center of congregation for local 22 during 
times of protest. On any given summer one could travel to the zócalo and witness thousands of 
teachers camping out in the plaza. Tents, overhead tarps, and teacher-ran tianguis (markets) 
would dominate the landscape. Large banners denouncing the government and corruption would 
hang from buildings surrounding the plaza. Carefully orchestrated “mega marches,” where tens 
of thousands and sometimes hundreds of thousands of teachers and sympathizers would begin or 
end in the zócalo. By contrast, in the years following 2006 the protest activity in the zócalo had 
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dramatically decreased. During the summer of 2017, for example, my visit to the zócalo was 
uneventful. There were no large-scale protests or sit-ins. The highest amount of teacher activity 
was a small group of a few dozen teachers from the Isthmus region of the state who were 
protesting the lack of government action regarding the bloody conflict in Nochixtlán the year 
prior. A quick trip three blocks from the zócalo to the local 22 headquarters revealed none of the 
bustling activities of teachers leaving, entering, and congregating and vendors normally seen 
selling documentaries and literature propagandizing the teacher movement and government 
corruption. 
 Also absent were the (in)famous mega-marches that would turn Oaxaca’s main avenues 
into overflowing pedestrian malls. This once dreaded form of protest had the effect of shutting 
down large swaths of Oaxaca City, effectively crippling the transportation that relies so heavily 
on the city's limited number of boulevards. The local continued to organize marches but on a 
much smaller scale. A couple thousand teachers would participate, and the effect was minimal. 
Yet there was still union activity. 
 These observations fueled a desire to understand what was happening to local 22, and 
when beginning to look at the history of local 22 two questions quickly became apparent: how 
did local 22 go from what was arguably its pinnacle of influence and power in 2006 to what 
appeared to be its nadir in 2016? and what events took place during that ten-year span that 
precipitated such a drastic shift for the local? The literature that exists on local 22 could not give 
me the answers, mostly because much of the literature focuses more on the events of 2006 and 
very little afterwards. I believed that the government violence against the protesters was partly 
responsible for local 22’s debilitation—but it could not have been the only factor. Local 22 has 
endured numerous violent confrontations at the hands of the police and other government forces 
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and from them emerged more defiant. Such violence, in general, has had the effect of increasing 
union participation and defiance during the period of protest (Levi, Olson, Agnone, & Kelly, 
2009). In such cases the anti-union violence galvanizes the union membership and raises public 
awareness to the injustices and the protest itself. This was most clearly seen in 2006 where the 
first acts of violence against local 22 set in motion the protest movement. The initial violence 
brought local 22 together with citizens and NGOs which led to the formation of APPO and a 
united push for Governor Ortiz’s resignation. 
 In trying to find the answers to local 22’s weakening and what events influenced that 
weakening the literature pointed me in a different direction. Instead of focusing so much on the 
external factors that weakened the union, such as the repression, I found myself wanting to better 
understand what was going on internally for local 22. Clearly, from the interviews I conducted, 
many teachers were not happy, and more importantly, not participating nearly as much during 
marches and sit-ins. The latter proved quite shocking because local 22 historically has found 
effective methods to incentivize its members that participate in protest activity such as by 
developing a point system based off of teacher attendance at protests that determines whether or 
not a teacher gets transferred to a more lucrative post or favorable location. The fact that this 
method failed to produce large turnout suggests that this system was no longer enforced or that it 
lost its effectiveness and the teachers did not fear the repercussions. One of the keys to 
understanding the situation of local 22 was found in the interviews I conducted.  
As each teacher I interviewed talked about local 22, two major themes emerged. The first 
was that many of the teachers I interviewed expressed concern that local 22 leadership had 
consolidated power and that they were in fact brokering deals with the government behind closed 
doors. Every interviewee that expressed this concern stated that they felt it began with the 
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negotiations to end the 2006 conflict. The second theme was that the trust that the rank and file 
had toward their leadership seemed to have eroded almost completely. Most of the teachers I 
interviewed expressed their displeasure with how the leadership had taken control of the union. 
Many felt left out of the decision-making process with their voices not being heard anymore. 
They felt that they had been left behind. Democracy, one of the foundational blocks of local 22, 
was talked about as though it had been completely undermined as teacher after teacher expressed 
their frustration. It appeared as if the political structure of local 22 had changed completely. The 
rank and file, once the motor behind local 22, felt powerless. The patterns expressed in the 
interviews suggested that local 22 had adopted a more oligarchical structure.   
 An investigation into the available literature regarding the local turned up a large body of 
information. Research that investigates the activism, history, and political and social influence of 
local 22 is plentiful. However, one issue quickly surfaced. The literature follows local 22 until 
the conflict of 2006. From 2007 to the present the scarcity of information is palpable. To a 
degree, this revelation was not surprising. The conflict of 2006, after all, was the climax of years 
of activism by the local. In 2006, all of the pieces came together—local 22 allied with the public 
and dozens of organizations, NGOs, and unions. The combined alliance became a factor too 
much for the government to handle, and the birth of APPO hinted that radical social change in 
Oaxaca was no longer on the horizon, but at the doorstep. That social change would never fully 
materialize. Six months after the conflict began, the government re-entered the city and assumed 
control. The movement was quashed and 2007 saw a business-as-usual environment. 
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Literature about oligarchy and previous research on local 22   
   The study of oligarchy in Mexico is nothing new. For decades political parties and trade 
unions functioned as oligarchs. President Porfirio Díaz, who ushered in the industrialization of 
Mexico at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries was able to continuously stay in 
power for twenty-six years, ruling as a dictator within an oligarch. Shortly after Díaz, what is 
now the PRI came into power and held onto it for seventy years. Most of Mexico’s biggest trade 
unions function as oligarchies (Handelman, 1979). Therefore, in order to understand the structure 
and dynamics of local 22 it is imperative to look at the role of oligarchy within organizations. In 
his seminal book Political Parties, Robert Michels lays out the argument that any democratic 
organization that grows large enough ultimately adopts oligarchical tendencies as a result of the 
organization bureaucratizing and centralizing power due to the unfeasibility of direct democracy 
(1962). This led Michels to famously state, “He who says organization, says oligarchy” (1962). 
He called this transition to oligarchy an “iron law,” an inevitable process that any growing 
organization must succumb to. As the organization grows participatory democracy becomes 
much more difficult to practice, limiting the effectiveness of public assemblies. The logistics and 
disparate ideologies among such a large number of members makes any kind of meaningful and 
productive voting and decision-making a near impossibility. As the organization grows “it is 
impossible for the collectivity to undertake the direct settlement of all the controversies that 
arise” (Michels, 1962). To mitigate the problem of large membership numbers Michels argues 
that organizations begin appointing delegates who, in turn, represent different sections of the 
organization much like the parliamentary systems in place in many democratic countries. And 
while proponents argue that this organizational structure permits the continuity of democracy 
(Seidle, 2003; Laver, 1994), Michels argues that the creation of delegates leads to a 
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centralization of power and the creation of an elite class within the organization (Nylen, Dodd, 
2003; Berberoglu, 2005). Heinrich Herkner goes so far to argue that any organization that 
entrusts the supervision of its affairs to the rank and file are doomed to extinction (Grusky, 
Miller, 1901). 
 Secondly, according to Michels, once an organization begins to bureaucratize it will 
adopt more oligarchical tendencies since the organization will begin to create new offices and 
departments and because a large membership will not have the capacity to make the daily 
decisions required to keep the organization functional (1962). While a smaller organization can 
effectively rely on public assemblies and direct democracy as decision-making methods, 
inevitably, once the organization grows large enough to where members must meet in different 
buildings and geographic regions it must bureaucratize and concentrate power into the hands of a 
few. This creation of a ruling class, or elite, within the organization then creates an atmosphere 
wherein those in power will desire to preserve and eventually expand their power within the 
organization. Michels believes this is the case because as human beings, people are subject to 
passions and mental and physical imperfections that will naturally contrast with the tendency of 
the mass (1962). In other words, no matter how committed to democracy and to the good of the 
organization the individual is, those beliefs succumb to a natural desire for power and self-
service. These tendencies naturally are not compatible with democracy and lead to a further 
alienation of the leadership from the rank and file. By applying these arguments to local 22 it is 
better understood how much oligarchy has contributed the weakening of the local between 2006 
and 2016. There is no doubt that local 22 contains oligarchic characteristics—it has a highly 
bureaucratized structure and the large size of local 22’s membership requires it to depend on 
representation through delegates. However, one question this paper attempts to answer is the 
14 
 
extent to which bureaucratization and centralization—in relation to repression—influenced the 
local’s shift toward oligarchy. 
 Mexico, and Latin America, for that matter, have a long and complicated history with 
oligarchy and so viewing local 22 as an example of democracy succumbing to oligarchy is 
nothing new. In a way, it can be expected since oligarchization is such an enduring characteristic 
of Mexican politics. The PRI maintained a more than seventy-year hegemony with the practice 
of oligarchy and corporatism, and the SNTE played a large part in perpetuating the PRI 
hegemony by wielding massive influence at the voter polls. Throughout the 20th century the PRI 
relied on unions and guilds for votes, and in exchange for party loyalty, the PRI would bestow 
benefits on union members, especially union leaders. It is not unheard of to hear about union 
leaders securing lucrative government posts or receiving generous bonuses. A very effective 
system of quid-pro-quo developed in an unbroken chain that lasted decades (Wuhs, 2008).  
Yet, not all large organizations (even some in Mexico) have adopted oligarchic 
tendencies. In one of the more well-known case studies, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) 
investigate the International Typographical Union (ITU) and come to the conclusion that the ITU 
was able to reject a shift to oligarchy due to a number of factors that Michels failed to mention. 
The authors look at the the founding of the union and found that contrary to the case studies done 
by Michels, such as with Germany’s Social Democratic Party, the ITU was organized more 
bottom-up than top-down. The ITU formed as a result of the consolidation of many unions, all of 
which placed heavy emphasis on individual autonomy. This permitted the rank and file to wield 
significant influence within the union regarding decisions that needed to be made. Additionally, 
the presence of factions within the unions helped to enforce a system of checks and balances 
where union leaders needed to stay within the parameters set forth by the rank and file or risk 
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being removed from their posts (1956). The authors conclude that these two factors were 
essential to permit the practice of direct democracy within the union even after it consolidated 
and grew much larger in membership. What the authors help us to see is that Michels’ theory on 
oligarchy is not foolproof, and that there exist factors outside of what Michels mentions that can 
drive a union toward or away from oligarchy. This is relevant when considering local 22 because 
the local displayed many of the same characteristics of the ITU. 
 Coming back to Mexico, Howard Handelman (1977) looks at a case study of union 
democracy in Mexico State. Similar to Lipset, he finds that the Mexican Union of Electrical 
Workers (SME) possessed many of the same characteristics as the ITU such as a strong 
connection to autonomy and accountability of leadership. Furthermore, the rank and file within 
the SME possessed similar education levels and class statuses to their ITU counterparts. The 
union leadership was held accountable to its members who represented different factions within 
the union. These factors are important to look at because local 22 shares many of the same traits 
as the SME. For example, the rank and file of local 22 has always maintained a strong 
connection to autonomy and its factious membership has tried to hold its leaders accountable. By 
looking at Lipset and Handleman and seeing that local 22 did not ultimately enjoy the success of 
the ITU and SME in maintaining a democratic organization, the argument that repression 
influenced local 22’s shift to oligarchy seems plausible and therefore helps to better explain what 
took place within local 22 between 2006 and 2016. 
        Most of the literature that centers on local 22, however, focuses on the activism and 
radicalism it displays and not on the politics and structure of the local itself. For example, Lynn 
Stephen looks at the pivotal year of 2006 for the union. In her book We are the Face of Oaxaca 
(2013), she explores how local 22 rose to power from a dissident faction of the national teachers’ 
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union (SNTE) to become one of the most active and radical locals in Latin America. Local 22’s 
rich history of protests and dissent against the government prepared it for the massive social 
movement of 2006 that led to the creation of the APPO and control of Oaxaca for the latter half 
of 2006. She then looks at the relationship between local 22 and the residents of the city to better 
understand how that union-citizen dynamic affected the events of 2006. Similarly, Diana 
Denham (2008) looks at how the social movement of 2006 galvanized the public to side with the 
striking teachers. She looks at how local 22 was able to work with different organizations and the 
public to realize large-scale marches and protests. A common theme found within the literature 
on local 22 is a positive image of what the local has accomplished through social movements and 
creating positive relationships with the citizens of the state. And those that delve into the inner-
workings of the local and the relationship between the rank and file and union leadership fail 
(consciously or subconsciously) to make the connection to oligarchy to help explain the 
breakdown of communication and trust between the leadership and rank and file.  
Maria Cook (1996), for example, looks at the relationship between rank and file and 
union leadership in her book Organizing Dissent but focuses more on how that relationship 
strengthened the local instead of weakening it. Cook provides a comprehensive and convincing 
history of teacher unionization in Mexico. Her research provides valuable information into the 
political climates and negotiating that took place to form the SNTE, the CNTE, and local 22 and 
provides excellent context of the political social milieu surrounding the teachers’ desire to 
unionize. Her investigation into union structures in Mexico help make sense of the turbulent 
politics in which these unions find themselves today. For example, she looks at the creation of 
the SNTE as an arm of the PRI and shows the reader that the SNTE inherited the corruption and 
clientelism that defined Mexican politics. This helps to put into perspective the role of the CNTE 
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when it formed as a faction of the SNTE. Its main goal was to provide participatory democracy 
and push back against the PRI, something the SNTE could never do because of its ties to the 
PRI. 
Marco Estrada Saavedra (2016) goes even deeper into the inner-workings of local 22 to 
highlight that while local 22 formed out of a rejection of the corruption and clientelism so 
prevalent in the PRI, it inevitably adopted the very characteristics it vehemently rejected. Estrada 
cites factors such as corporatism, the political culture of Oaxaca, the lure of political gain for 
siding with the PRI, and conflicting ideologies within local 22 leadership. Through detailed 
research and interviews with local 22 delegates Estrada Saavedra is able to provide the reader 
access to this little-known aspect of the local. The literature shows how local 22 has been able to 
find success while navigating the turbulent currents of Mexican politics. Some of this navigating 
includes making compromises on established beliefs—such as a total lack of affiliation with the 
PRI—in order to continue existing as a legitimate and influential organization in Mexico. Local 
22, for example, did adopt some corporatist tendencies as Cook (1996) and Estrada Saavedra 
(2016) point out. But, overwhelmingly the literature focuses on the growth and strength of local 
22, highlighting its democracy, and failing to take notice or explore the factors that have 
contributed to local 22’s debilitation. Both Stephen and Estrada Saavedra, for example, 
published their books well after the events of 2006, yet they do not explore the precarious state 
of the local. 
Stephen, Cook, and Estrada Saavedra, among others, provide needed insight into union 
relations with the public and government which helps to highlight the many factors that have 
affected the direction local 22 has taken over the last decade. But the dearth of conversation 
centering on local 22 and its oligarchic structure highlights the narrow lens through which 
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scholars view the local. Thus, local 22 presents a compelling case study to analyze with Michels’ 
theory. At 70,000 members strong, the highly bureaucratized and centralized local 22 appears to 
conform to Michels’ “iron law,” yet his theory focuses exclusively on those internal factors 
(membership count, bureaucracy, centralized power, specialized administrative positions) 
without taking into account the external factors (repression, corporatism) that can influence an 
organization’s adoption of oligarchic tendencies. 
 
Why local 22? 
 The experience of local 22 presents a compelling moment in Mexican unionism to 
investigate. For one, local 22 is well-known among unions in Mexico for its activism and 
aggressive mobilization tactics. Its ability to mobilize tens of thousands of teachers, many times 
on short notice, is a result of decades of protesting, winning over the loyalty of the rank and file, 
and the local’s advanced understanding of logistics and its ability to manipulate its members. 
Local 22, historically, has also been one of the handful of locals in Mexico that has been able to 
maintain a participatory democracy among its rank and file, rejecting the almost inevitable shift 
that Mexican unions and locals make toward corporatism and subordination to the PRI (Penman-
Lomeli, 2016).  Furthermore, local 22 prides itself as one of the more progressive locals in 
Mexico where indigeneity is embraced and animosity, and at times hostility, toward the local and 
federal government is vehemently practiced. These factors have permitted local 22 to emerge as 
a leader within Mexican unionism.  
 More importantly, however, local 22 since its founding has found ways to endure 
government repression and emerge stronger and more unified as a result. Looking at Mexican 
labor history, the political and military pressure applied by the PRI has folded unions and forced 
19 
 
others to become loyal to the party which makes the experience of local 22 so intriguing. The 
local’s rich history of participatory democracy has helped to keep the local grounded in its 
ideologies. Understanding the environment from which local 22 emerged helps to better 
understand the significance of the formation and struggles of local 22 throughout its history. 
Beginning with Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas in the 1930s, many unions in Mexico have 
been sanctioned and controlled by the PRI. As a result, corruption within unions became 
widespread and much of the decision-making process by unions was heavily influenced by 
politicians. One of the more well-known examples of this type of relationship is with the SNTE 
(National Union of Education Workers). Formed under the auspices of the PRI in the 1940s the 
SNTE quickly grew to become the largest union in Mexico and one of the largest in Latin 
America. It boasts a membership today of more than 1.6 million with a presence in every 
Mexican state (Islas, 2018). Throughout the 20th century, the PRI’s ubiquitous presence across 
Mexico favored the party since it could use the SNTE as a political ally. In exchange for party 
loyalty, which included using the SNTE to influence communities to vote for PRI candidates 
ensuring that PRI congresspeople, senators, governors, and presidents won elections and 
remained in office, the PRI would bestow political favors and financial gifts to union members.  
From its inception the SNTE was never democratic nor was democracy within the union 
ever a consideration. The PRI exercised a great deal of influence in deciding who would be the 
delegates and secretaries general, and major policy suggestions within the SNTE would either 
originate or terminate with the PRI (Estrada Saavedra, 2016). In other words, the PRI prevented 
the establishment of a democratic apparatus. The SNTE was strictly a top down organization 
with the leadership making decisions and the rank and file deferring the decision-making to the 
leadership. It was not until the 1960s that members within the SNTE began to publicly criticize 
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and organize against the PRI’s control of the union and the lack of democracy (La Botz, 2016). 
From this movement in the 1960s emerged the much more significant opposition movement of 
the 1970s when a faction of the SNTE successfully formed a caucus that challenged the status 
quo within the union. That caucus, the CNTE (National Council of Education Workers) made 
democracy a central tenant of its existence. The CNTE’s principal purpose was to repudiate the 
corporatist relationship between the SNTE and the PRI and move away from the corruption that 
maintained a stranglehold on the SNTE. The CNTE also desired to promote a strictly bottom up 
union organization where the rank and file now became the decision-makers instead of the union 
leadership and the PRI (La Botz, 2016). 
It was just after the formation of the CNTE that local 22 emerged in Oaxaca. Drawn to 
the democratic and progressive ideologies of the CNTE, local 22 quickly rose in prominence and 
by the 1990s had established itself as one of the preeminent locals in all of Mexico. It took the 
charge in leading protests against the federal government, at times marching by foot the 287 
miles from Oaxaca City to Mexico City in long caravans of travelers. Local 22 became a symbol 
of democracy and resilience through its success in establishing a bottom-up power structure 
giving the rank and file the decision-making power to decide on local 22 issues. Year after year, 
local 22 enjoyed success in winning government concessions in Oaxaca which meant salary 
increases for teachers, added monetary bonuses at the end of the year, and increased funding for 
education. It is for these reasons that when the movement of 2006 began and local 22 invested it 
resources in APPO and removing Governor Ulises Ruiz Ortiz from office that national and 
international attention was focused on Oaxaca and what local 22 would accomplish there. 
However, the defeat of the movement in 2006 opened local 22 up to increased scrutiny.  
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The relationship between the rank and file and the leadership became a point of concern 
as accusations of corruption within local 22, especially among the leadership, became an area of 
focus for many rank and file members (León, 2016; Estrada 2016). Accusations that the 
leadership had “sold out” the movement and made deals with the government to end the 2006 
conflict and exonerate themselves from any future government retaliation quickly began to 
spread among the base and angered many—especially those teachers who had sacrificed a great 
deal physically, emotionally, and economically, and who struggled to maintain the barricades 
throughout the city, exposing themselves to intense violence. While during the 2006 conflict 
many within and outside local 22 believed that the movement would continue until the 
government conceded to the local’s and APPO’s demands, in retrospect those beliefs were based 
off of false assumptions many in the rank and file held regarding their leaders (Noe, personal 
communication, August 17, 2017). Enrique Rueda Pacheco, the Secretary General of local 22 
during the conflict, was accused of accepting a bribe of $25 million pesos from the government 
to end the protests (Marín, 2019), and in February of 2007, Pacheco resigned as Secretary 
General after 800 delegates in the state assembly of local 22 declared him a traitor to the 
movement (Velez, 2007). These events quickly eroded the trust the rank and file had for its 
leaders and many teachers in the movement accused local 22 leadership of betrayal. 
Furthermore, what stung the rank and file following their defeat in 2006 was the belief that they 
were not consulted with nor considered when local 22 leadership agreed with the government to 
end the protests (Paty, personal communication, August 15, 2017). 
These events showed a much different local than it was known for. Transparency, 
influence of the rank and file, democracy, activism—these were all qualities that local 22 
embraced, and for the most part, were known for. Yet all of that was put into question after the 
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conflict of 2006 and in the years following. Increasing accusations of corruption, a lack of rank 
and file influence in local 22 issues, and an increasing centralization of power and influence in 
the local projected an image of the local as the very thing it had fought so hard against. By 2016, 
it seemed as if the only factor that differentiated local 22 from the PRI was its name. More 
importantly, following the 2006 conflict, local 22 began to display increased oligarchic 
tendencies, which seemed improbable given local 22’s history of democracy and bottom-up 
participation. Yet, given the circumstances of how the 2006 protests ended and the actions of 
local 22 in the following years, the argument that local 22 became more oligarchic seems much 
more plausible.          
 
Methodology of thesis 
In order to find answers to my questions regarding oligarchy I conducted observations 
focused on the areas most heavily trafficked by local 22 such as the zócalo and the local’s 
headquarters. Every summer the zócalo acts as ground zero for the protests. There, teachers 
converge and spend weeks living there. Marches either begin or end in the zócalo, providing a 
more intimate view of the logistics and organization efforts made by the rank and file and the 
leadership. It is also an ideal opportunity to observe the individual actions of teachers to gauge 
morale. Three blocks from the zócalo is where local 22’s headquarters can be found. Aside from 
the teachers that constantly stream in and out of the building are the vendors outside and in the 
lobby, who sell pro-local 22 propaganda and paraphernalia. I arrived in Oaxaca City in June and 
conducted field research until August 24 which gave me ample time to visit the zócalo, local 22 
headquarters, and different regions of the state on multiple occasions to make observations and 
perform interviews.   
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The focus of my field research centered on interviewing members of local 22 and 
obtaining first-hand knowledge of rank-and-file experiences. For this research project I 
interviewed twenty-four teachers all of whom are members of local 22. All are members of the 
rank and file with two of the interviewees having previously served in leadership positions for 
the local. Oscar was a regional representative in the Central Valleys region and Noe served as a 
high-ranking secretary in the city. To protect my interviewees’ confidentiality and identity I have 
not used their real names but have inserted pseudonyms. Of the twenty-four interviewees, all but 
one participated in the protest movement of 2006. The one that did not was not a teacher at the 
time, but she did participate in the movement as a civilian assisting at various barricades.  
Interviews became vital to better understand some of the components that led to the 
fallout experienced by the local from 2006 to the present, especially since literature on the 
subject was not available. Originally, my plan was to begin interviewing teachers at the zócalo 
since I knew that many of them would be there for the annual demands and protests. Due to the 
fact that participation in local 22 sanctioned protests is mandatory for teachers the probability of 
interviewing union members with differing sentiments and ideologies regarding the local would 
be high. I was confident that I would find teachers highly favorable of local 22, others who felt 
disillusioned, and everything else in between. However, during the summer of 2017 no large-
scale protests were held in the zócalo, and it quickly became a challenge to find a sufficient 
number of teachers to interview.  
During the following two months I relied heavily on snowball sampling with the hope 
that a sufficient range of teacher sentiments would be covered. This sampling method, however, 
allowed me to expand the geographic area of research from mainly Oaxaca City's zócalo and 
surrounding neighborhoods to different regions in the state. Not only was I able to carry out 
24 
 
interviews in the Oaxaca City metropolitan area, but I interviewed teachers in Juchitán de 
Zaragoza, Nochixtlán, and Santa Maria Tiltepec. In Juchitán, I interviewed five teachers, in 
Nochixtlán two, and two in Santa Maria Tiltepec. The advantage of being able to broaden the 
geographic range of interviewees is that I was able to see how regional cultures play a role in the 
makeup of the local. The interviewees in Juchitán, for example, were the most radical. 
Indigeneity factored in heavily in their ideologies and they regularly expressed pride in their 
Zapotec heritage. They saw violence as a necessary element to advance the demands of the local 
whereas the other interviewees viewed violence as something avoidable and viable only if all 
other options were exhausted. Unsurprisingly, in 2017 when protest activity was relatively quiet 
in Oaxaca City, the teachers in Juchitán were engaged in a three-month long blockade of the 
main highway that leads into the city resulting in numerous skirmishes with police forces. This 
broader pool of data helps to shed light on the state of local 22, not just in Oaxaca City, but 
beyond as well. This information became crucial when piecing together the data to help make 
sense of the current condition of local 22. 
For example, performing the interviews gave me insight into the interviewees’ 
perceptions of the local which in turn helped me to construct a clearer picture of the internal state 
of the local. I received a broad range of opinions and experiences from the interviewees. 
Interestingly, of the twenty-four interviewees that I spoke with, twenty of them were critical of 
the local and its top leadership and the other four expressed praise in what the leadership was 
accomplishing especially regarding the resistance to the education reforms the federal 
government had been attempting to carry out since 2012. The interviews, which looked at the 
interviewees’ history with the local, their participation in protest movements, their experience in 
2006, their perceptions and relationship to their leaders, and their experiences as members from 
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2006 to the present helped me to see that there indeed existed significant discontinuity within the 
local. Furthermore, the interviews revealed to me that factions within the local have led to 
contention among the rank and file.  
This research, however, is not without its flaws. For one, the sampling size is too small to 
be able to come to any kind of conclusion regarding local 22 and its loss of influence and power 
in the years following 2006. An analysis of the interviews from the smaller sample size may not 
provide a comprehensive enough picture of the condition of local 22 because the entire range of 
opinions held by union members more likely than not is not represented in the study. Indeed, 
interviews are always biased and when the sampling size is as small as it was for this study 
incongruencies tend to appear. As a result, attempting to reconstruct an accurate history of events 
within local 22 was difficult. Furthermore, more interviews with union leadership are required to 
more accurately gauge the environment within local 22 and to substantiate or question the 
accusations and sentiments of rank and file members. Interviews with ex-local 22 members who 
now belong to local 59 (the government sanctioned local in opposition to local 22) would also 
provide valuable insight into the conditions that caused them to defect. Yet, despite these 
shortcomings, the research provides a foundation or staring point on which further research may 
build since studies focusing on oligarchy within local 22 are almost non-existent. 
 
Thesis argument 
 When looking at politics and labor unions in Mexico two common themes tend to surface 
more than others—oligarchy and corporatism. Both have a rich history in Mexico and both co-
exist in many cases. Perhaps this is best seen with the PRI, and it can be argued that corporatism 
is in the party’s DNA. Its predecessor, the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), was founded in 
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1929 by a diverse group of leaders who immediately brought into their new party a corporatist 
structure (Grayson, 2011). Throughout the 20th century the PNR and subsequently the PRI have 
benefited from a monopoly of power, and virtually all of the major labor organizations 
established in Mexico are or have been in some way affiliated with the PRI (Grayson, 2011). The 
PRI’s presence has influenced and pressured other organizations to adopt the PRI’s highly 
oligarchic structure. Most, if not all, of the big trade unions that were formed in the 20th century 
under the auspices of the PRI—the national teachers union, the oil workers union, and the 
Confederation of Mexican Workers—are highly centralized and exhibit oligarchic 
characteristics. Corporatism has held an indelible mark in Mexican politics and society, helping 
to dictate the trajectory of the country for more than a hundred years and legitimizing the PRI’s 
grip on power and its continued hegemony.  
The SNTE is an excellent example of this, having been formed by President Ávila 
Camacho in 1943 as a way to bring teachers under the party and secure votes during political 
elections. This corporatist relationship also influenced the SNTE’s oligarchical structure. A 
common argument that is made when talking about Mexican labor and politics is that the PRI 
influences organizations to become oligarchical. It could be argued that local 22’s own shift to 
oligarchy can be attributed to the SNTE’s relationship with the PRI. In fact, local 22 and the PRI 
have in the past established a corporatist relationship. The decade of the 1990s provides an 
excellent example of this when the PRI offered to hand over control of the education system to 
local 22 in exchange for the local’s support of policies ratified by the PRI. This corporatist 
relationship did have a measure of influence in local 22 adopting some oligarchic tendencies, 
especially bureaucratization and specialization. Yet, the local was able to successfully maintain 
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its democracy and the rank and file still exercised significant influence over tactical decisions 
made by the local.   
Using Michels’ theory of oligarchy as a foundation, this paper argues that Michels 
focuses on the internal factors (centralization of power, bureaucratization, and specialization) 
that push an organization to adopt oligarchic tendencies, and by doing so, fails to acknowledge 
the external factors (repression and corporatism) that influence the oligarchization of the 
organization. In this light, this paper attempts to add to Michels’ theory by establishing 
repression as an influencing factor in oligarchization by looking at the experience of local 22. 
What I argue, ultimately, is that internal pressure in the form of divergent ideologies among local 
22 members and external pressure in the form of violent and political repression from both the 
federal and state government forced local 22 to become more oligarchic to preserve its existence. 
The government’s relentless attacks against local 22 since 2006 have placed the local in a 
vulnerable and precarious position. Leading up to the events of 2006, for example, local 22 had 
weathered a multitude of government repression. Arbitrary arrests, torture, rape, and beatings 
have always been a part of the experience of being a local 22 member. When a teacher took to 
the streets in protest he or she expected to be treated in a violent manner, but the scale of 
repression that took place at the end of 2006 was unheard of in Oaxaca. In conjunction with the 
federal government, state police forces carried out an offensive that struck a new kind of fear in 
many of the protestors. At least twenty-two teachers were killed during the second half of 2006 
with many of those coming during the government’s final offensive in November to wrest 
control of the city from the protestors and the presence of paramilitaries patrolling the streets 
throughout the conflict, shooting at protestors and destroying barricades, exacerbated an already 
tenuous morale among the protesters.  
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Many in the union did not think the government would be capable of causing such 
atrocities and so when the killings began to mount many within the movement began to second 
guess the viability of continuing. Since 2006, local 22 has not been successful in rallying a large-
scale movement like that of 2006. After the killings of teachers and civilians in Nochixtlán at the 
hands of the police in 2016 no mass protests or mega marches such as those seen in 2006 came 
to fruition. In fact, other than public denunciations of the crimes committed, nothing else really 
happened. The government’s ability to create instability within the union has put pressure on the 
union leadership to find ways to keep the union together. By exercising a more top-down power 
structure within local 22 the leadership can prioritize the need to make quick decisions to 
government actions against them that would otherwise be bogged down if left to the rank and file 
to vote. Furthermore, by centralizing its power, local 22 leaders can attempt to instill order and a 
sense of stability and leadership to keep local 22 afloat in the face of attacks and prevent the rank 
and file from defecting. This, combined with the large amount of ideological and cultural 
diversity among the rank and file factored in to the local’s shift to a more oligarchic structure.  
Internally within the local it is not uncommon for infighting to take place among factions 
within the union. The existence of this disparity in opinions and viewpoints has pressured the 
union leadership to find some common ground where the differing ideologies can co-exist. 
Arguably, one way to do this is to create a strong centralized power structure that can act as the 
glue that keeps the different groups together and working toward the same goals. One factor 
behind the collapse of the 2006 movement was the inability of people with different ideologies to 
compromise and coalesce around a shared objective. Each faction was unwavering in its desire to 
obtain its wants such as increased protest activity, more dialogue with the government, and more 
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radical rebellion, even sanctioned violence against the government and its sympathizers. These 
factors became too much of a burden for the movement’s leaders to overcome. 
This internal instability within the union also opened up new opportunities for the 
government to put increased pressure on local 22. As will be explored, the state government 
dealt a heavy blow to local 22 in 2015 with the governor’s decree that purged the IEEPO (State 
Institute of Public Education of Oaxaca) of local 22 members. Furthermore, the government’s 
creation of a new teachers’ union, local 59, to rival local 22 began to attract teachers who were 
promised more financial and material resources. The promises of more affordable loans with 
lower interest rates and larger credit for teachers to purchase homes and other needed materials 
has enticed many in local 22 to defect. Furthermore, the state government promises quicker 
approval and distribution of funds for school projects and much needed renovations—the very 
issues local 22 has spent years lobbying and protesting for improvements. More frequent 
instances of government repression, such as the 2016 conflict in Nochixtlán, and withholding 
teachers’ paychecks further widened the fissure. While these factors help to answer the question 
of why and how local 22 lost its power and influence since 2006, they also help to address the 
factors behind the oligarchization of the local. That local 22 has had to endure and weather both 
endogenous and exogenous opposition shows the extent of strain placed upon the local of which 
the effect has been debilitating. 
My focus on repression as the key factor that drove local 22 toward oligarchy intends to 
de-emphasize the influence of corporatism on the local. This is not to say, however, that 
corporatism has not contributed to the oligarchization of local 22, but that its effects were 
subordinate to those of repression. Corporatism began local 22’s shift toward oligarchy, but 
repression completed the shift by pressuring local 22 leadership to restrict democratic 
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participation among the rank and file. While corporatism has significantly affected many trade 
unions in Mexico by forcing partnerships with the PRI and severely limiting the autonomy of 
those organizations, it is more difficult to make the argument that the same can be said of local 
22. The interviews I conducted along with an investigation of the available research on local 22 
and other theoretical texts and case studies of oligarchization within organizations helped me 
come to this conclusion, and what I wanted to then better understand was how the violence and 
repression pushed local 22 to adopt more oligarchic tendencies, especially given the local’s long 
history of participatory democracy among the rank and file and tenacity in the face of 
government repression.  
 
Thesis map 
  This paper begins by taking a historical look at the SNTE, CNTE, and local 22 to help 
explain the complicated and tenuous relationship all three organizations share with each other. In 
chapter one the history of the SNTE and the CNTE is explored. Part of this history looks at the 
PRI’s desire to establish a teachers union in order to strengthen its own party, a move that greatly 
benefited the PRI by assuring its hegemony in politics for most of the 20th century. Chapter one 
also explores the corporatist relationship between the SNTE and the PRI and highlights the 
oligarchic structure that dominated both organizations. From this relationship emerged the CNTE 
as a repudiation of not only oligarchy, but of the PRI as well. A desire to establish a democratic 
union became the rallying cry of the CNTE and soon thereafter local 22.  
Chapter two looks at the rise of local 22 and the factors that promoted the local’s growth 
in membership, influence, and power. Much of the focus will be on the decade of the 1990s and 
up until the conflict of 2006. For the most part, those fifteen years were the most formative for 
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the local and it experienced most of its growth during that period. The chapter also investigates 
the local’s success as a democratic organization, using its influence to begin to adopt social 
justice causes into its platform. The chapter also looks into local 22’s success in establishing 
alliances in Oaxaca and how those relationships greatly benefited the local. As local 22 
continued to grow, its influence was felt among more rural communities as teachers began to 
arrive at those communities and establish a rapport with community members. Similar to the way 
the building of alliances benefited local 22 during the 2006 conflict, so to did the relationship 
with rural communities as they were frequently the first segments of the population to support 
the local’s activities. However, oligarchic tendencies within the local began long before the 
conflict of 2006. The existence of factions and indigeneity among the general membership 
pressured the leaders to maintain a level of stability within the local. The turning point for the 
local is the conflict of 2006 which threatened the existence of the local and pressured it to 
centralize its power as a way to survive.  
Chapter three looks specifically at how government repression against local 22 from 2006 
to 2016 became the biggest factor in pushing local 22 to become oligarchic. This is brought into 
conversation with Michels’ theory showing how his theory does not account for the external 
forces that push an organization toward oligarchy. Both violent and non-violent repression are 
examined such as the conflicts of 2006 and 2016 and also the governor’s decision to remove 
local 22 affiliated employees from the IEEPO and the creation of rival local 59 to incentivize 
local 22 members to defect. Also addressed are the education reforms of President Peña Nieto 
which local 22, along with the CNTE, saw as an attempt to give the government more power 
over labor unions with the intention of undermining labor movements.    
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Finally, the conclusion looks at how research on local 22 can add to the existing 
conversation of oligarchy and the reasons why organizations drift away from democracy. For 
example, large democratic unions in Mexico such as the Electrical Workers Union have faced 
increased pressure from the government such as when President Felipe Calderon sent the federal 
police to the headquarters of Central Light and Power to take possession of the property and fire 
the thousands of workers assigned there. The effects that move had on the organizational 
structure of the Electrical Union has not been studied, and it would be fitting to see whether or 
not the government’s attack affected the democratic integrity of the union. Latin America as a 
whole has a long history with democratic organizations adopting oligarchical tendencies and 
intense government repression, and the ability to study the intersection of those two factors could 
possibly find that repression had a role in the oligarchical shift.     
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Chapter 1: The Rise of Unionism among Mexico’s Teachers   
 
Given Mexico’s long history of corruption, repression, and oligarchy within politics and 
organizations, the fact that a teachers union as oppositional as local 22 is to the government can 
exist shows that the nature of corruption in organizations is not completely unavoidable. Local 
22 sprang up out of a long history of conflict within the debate of unionism in the sphere of 
education. This chapter will look at the beginnings of that conflict and how the creation of a 
national teachers union sanctioned and sponsored by the ruling political party influenced the 
democratic ideals espoused by the dissident CNTE and the more militant local 22. It was the 
oligarchical structure of the national teachers union that inspired a movement composed of 
disillusioned teachers within the union to break away and establish a democratic and independent 
answer to the PRI and and the SNTE.       
 
Laying the seeds for a National Teachers’ Union 
During the Porfiriato of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, President Porfirio Diaz 
engaged in an intense campaign to industrialize Mexico. Massive infrastructure projects, such as 
railroad sought to connect the scattered cities and towns from Baja California to Chiapas to 
Yucatan. This new-found interconnection between the large Mexican territory allowed for the 
proliferation of large-scale manufacturing of goods. Steel, cement, textiles, paper, and glass soon 
began making their way into consumers’ homes throughout the country (Haber, 1989). Coupled 
with Mexico’s entrance into industrialization was a perceived sense of stability both economical 
and political. Diaz’s nearly thirty-five-year occupation of power lent to that perception. While 
Diaz’s dictatorship ultimately led to the second Mexican Revolution beginning in 1910 it was 
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influential in establishing the conditions required to transition the Mexican nation from a 
primarily agricultural and rural one to a more urbanized and modern society (Evens, 2012). This 
new identity allowed for a dramatic increase in population over the following decades (especially 
after the revolution). 
 Believing that an industrialized and entrepreneurial Mexico would require a larger 
educated workforce Diaz made education, especially higher education and the sciences, a focus 
of his presidency. Two of his ministers of public instruction, Joaquín Baranda and Justo Sierra, 
were largely responsible for the expansion of normal schools throughout the country. At normal 
schools, students were taught and groomed to be the next generation of educators at all levels. 
This new influx of credentialed teachers accompanied a large expansion of school construction, 
and primary, secondary, and preparatory schools were built all across Mexico (Andrade, 1996). 
Furthermore, institutions of higher education were created and other extant institutions were 
reorganized. Justo Sierra, for example, became influential in establishing the National School of 
Higher Education in 1910, and he successfully reorganized the National University of Mexico 
from its predecessor, the Royal and Pontifical University of Mexico. These changes in the 
educational system, along with the creation of the rural Schools of Rudimentary Instruction, 
opened up public education to a large portion of the Mexican population. 
 Yet the expansion of education among Mexican citizens also brought new problems. One 
major issue was funding. While Diaz invested in education, his focus was more on universities 
and other institutions of higher learning. Primary and secondary schools did not receive 
significant attention and state budgets were highly devoid of funds to funnel toward education 
costs. As a result, educational inequalities proliferated across the country with more urban 
schools such as those in Mexico City receiving a disproportionate amount of government 
35 
 
funding compared to their rural counterparts. Education funding in the southern states of 
Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Veracruz, and Tabasco was dismal at best, and this led to an increase 
in teacher discontent (Henderson, 2000). In the south teachers began to come together with the 
hope of unionizing. Yet under the Diaz regime the teachers stood little chance of success. 
Vehemently opposed to any kind of unionization, Diaz cultivated a government indifferent and at 
times repressive against labor movements (Olmedo, 2007). As a result, the teachers could only 
form informal organizations that were largely clandestine. These small and scattered groups 
remained powerless and found support primarily from anarchists which served to only increase 
Diaz’s distrust of unions and organizations that pushed back against his reforms (Olmedo, 2007). 
With the teachers’ inability to unionize, education remained highly fragmented and geography 
continued to influence education funding. It was not until the revolution and the immediate 
decades following that teachers would make significant strides in unionization and government 
recognition. 
 The revolution changed the way in which education was viewed in Mexico. Whereas 
before it was seen more as a privilege granted to the middle and upper-class population and 
largely provided by the Catholic church, the revolution shifted the onus of education back on the 
government, as envisioned by an earlier president, Benito Juarez, and made the common people 
the focus of education. Education was to be secular and free and available to all regardless of 
class and ethnicity (La Botz, 2016). To a degree, this is what Diaz desired and attempted to 
implement, but the revolution sought to rectify his and previous administrations’ failures 
regarding the execution of free and indiscriminate education. While the role and availability of 
education increased under Diaz, the revolution introduced a new era of education expansion. 
Holding true to the ideals of the revolution, President Álvaro Obregón, the first to lead the 
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country in the aftermath of the war, created the Secretariat of Public Education (SEP) in 1921. 
This would be the first time that a cabinet position would be created to specifically oversee 
education and counsel with the president over education affairs. The creation of the SEP signaled 
to the country and especially to the teachers that the government was ready to make education a 
priority and that educators would be an influential voice in deciding the future of education in 
Mexico. 
 Furthermore, the appointment of Jose Vasconcelos, a leftist revolutionary, philosopher, 
and future author of the controversial book The Cosmic Race—which presents an argument to 
eradicate indigeneity by amalgamating all races into a new “cosmic race” (Miller, 2004)—as the 
first secretary of the SEP sent a message that the government was in some regards ready to 
distance itself more from the elite and bourgeois class and focus on the needs of the people of 
Mexico. Vasconcelos immediately began working to expand schools, libraries, and the fine arts 
in order to increase public literacy (McCarthy, 2005). He saw ignorance as a stumbling block to 
Mexico’s progress as a world power and strove to establish a new common Mexican identity that 
would transcend all races and ethnicities. He saw teachers as missionaries disseminating truth 
and hope to the uneducated (La Botz, 2016). Consequently, Vasconcelos advocated for mestizaje 
which sought to do away with indigeneity and elevate Spanish heritage (Manrique, 2016). 
However, Vasconcelos’ campaign to increase literacy and further involve teachers helped to 
empower the teachers and their desire to become better represented through unionization. 
 Yet, the prospect of unionization seemed to elude educators even with Obregón’s reforms 
at the beginning of his presidency. This partly had to do with Diaz’s dislike of labor unions in 
general and oppression against those that tried to unionize. Under the Diaz regime any such 
movement was quashed, and the period during the revolution shifted the focus away from labor 
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reform and rights. It was not until Obregón created the Department of Labor that the prospect of 
unionizing became a reality (Krauze, 1998). The powerful Regional Confederation of Mexican 
Workers (CROM) was influential in paving the way for labor reform during and after Obregón’s 
presidency. A conglomerate of labor unions, the CROM was founded during the waning years of 
the revolution in 1918 and was influential in electing Obregón to the presidency. Out of an act of 
quid-quo-pro Obregón recognized the CROM and bestowed a significant amount of power to the 
confederation such as allowing it to dominate the federal labor department (Suarez-Potts, 2012). 
Thrusting the CROM into a position of power at the national level redefined the place and 
influence of labor unions and paved the way for a proliferation of national movements to 
unionize. Especially during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s a large increase in labor unions occurred. 
Organizations such as the Federation of Union Workers in the Service of the State (FSTSE), 
Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants (CROC), and National Federation of 
Independent Unions (FNSI), among others, were created. It is not surprising that the national 
teachers’ union (SNTE) was founded during this time period as well. 
 With a growing presence of teachers  throughout the country and the reality that they 
represented a growing social force, the necessity to unionize was never stronger. Teachers were 
struggling with unstable job security and low wages and in their current fragmented state with 
fractured and disparate unions a consolidation seemed to be the only answer. With Obregón’s 
creation of both a department of education and another of labor, educators took advantage of the 
situation before them and during the presidency of Plutarco Calles created the National 
Confederation of Teachers in 1926 and the National Confederation of Education Workers in 
1928 (Olivé, 2000). For the first time teachers were represented on a national level and their 
demands were heard in Mexico City. Both unions were effective in consolidating teacher 
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representation in order to amplify its effect on national legislation. And both aided in finally 
promoting teachers’ movements to strike and protest. However, both unions also insufficiently 
covered all of Mexico’s teachers, and the existence of both unions inevitably created conflict 
between the two. The Communist Party of Mexico, for example, placed its support behind the 
National Confederation of Education Workers while the National Confederation of Teachers 
more closely aligned with the federal government (Hamilton, 2014). Furthermore, urban 
educators had more access to union membership and activity and many of their rural counterparts 
were left on the outside looking in. 
 The weaknesses of both unions showed how much more needed to be done to promote 
unified teacher unionization. But the two unions also hinted at the power that a united teachers’ 
movement could wield on the national level, especially for the newly created National 
Revolutionary Party (PNR), the predecessor to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which 
in the 1930s was riding a wave of popularity that solidified its place at the apex of Mexican 
politics for the next seventy years. The party saw teachers as a vehicle to ensure PNR/PRI 
dominance in state and federal elections, and politicians moved quickly to form that relationship.              
         
Creation of the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE) 
While the National Confederation of Teachers and the National Confederation of 
Education Workers highlighted the deficiencies in the unionization of teachers, regional unions 
continued to exist state by state. Having had success in creating and maintaining regional 
teachers unions throughout the country, teachers and union leaders continued to look for ways to 
consolidate into one large union. The regional unions lacked the power to influence any type of 
legislation on the federal level while enjoying minimal success at the state level. The teachers 
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unions in Oaxaca, for example, succeeded in concessions that provided an extremely modest 
stipend to children whose families reported financial needs (McNamara, 2012). Yet, the desire to 
affect laws at the federal level seemed too elusive for the hundreds of teachers unions. The 
thought of a national teachers union that would wield the influence and power necessary to affect 
federal laws regarding education and labor became a source of motivation especially in the years 
following the revolution when more populist leaders such as Lázaro Cárdenas would lead the 
country. 
It was not until 1932, nearly fifteen years removed from the end of the revolution, that the 
seeds of the first true national teachers union would be planted. The creation of the Mexican 
Federation of Teachers (CMM) became the first concerted effort to represent all of the teachers 
in Mexico. For the next nine years the CMM along with the PNR/PRI worked to consolidate the 
many regional teachers unions into one national syndicate (Espinosa, 1982). From its inception 
the CMM strongly identified with the SEP and elements of corporatism began to infiltrate within 
that relationship. The PNR/PRI quickly fomented a strong relationship with the CMM and 
became a catalyst to the transition of the CMM to the SNTE in 1943. Nowhere was this seen 
more than during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas. 
An extremely popular figure and a populist, Cárdenas focused his presidency on fulfilling 
the ideals of the revolution. Land, labor, and education reforms defined his presidency. Agrarian 
reform was mostly accomplished as Cárdenas returned large swaths of lands to communities and 
indigenous peoples to be used as ejidos—plots of land shared by the community. Both the 
petroleum and railroad industries were nationalized, and more power was given to unions. 
Cárdenas, for example, was sympathetic to the working class and saw the importance of 
recognizing and addressing teachers’ needs. When Cárdenas nationalized the petroleum industry 
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in 1938 and created the state-run petroleum company Pemex, many believed that the creation of 
a more centralized national teachers union was inevitable since Cárdenas had undertaken an 
aggressive campaign to promote unionization throughout Mexico. As a self-identified socialist 
Cárdenas attempted to forge relationships with unions to help guarantee his party’s place in 
power and establish what would become the hegemony of the PRI. Cárdenas also saw education 
as a vehicle through which he and his party could establish legitimacy. He undertook efforts to 
further minimize the influence of the Catholic church in education, and he sought to further 
expand education to Mexico’s indigenous population, two moves that many educators agreed 
with. A strong relationship with the teachers unions was key to realizing these efforts and 
Cárdenas took steps to further centralize and consolidate the CMM and other teachers’ unions 
(Cook, 1996). He began to host “Unity Congresses” where the different teachers unions 
representatives would come together to talk about the issues they faced. Cárdenas hoped that 
these congresses would help the unions see that their struggles were shared and that the notion of 
joining together to form a single union would be the best option to address their struggles (Cook, 
1996).  
When Cárdenas handed over power to incoming president Manuel Camacho in 1940, the 
teachers’ movement to unionize had gained a great deal of momentum, and in 1943 Camacho 
finally placed the last piece to the puzzle and created the SNTE. Decades of work and hundreds 
of teachers unions were required for this moment to come to pass. Finally, teachers throughout 
Mexico were represented by the same organization. And although Camacho’s accomplishment in 
creating the SNTE appeared to stem from a genuine altruism on his part to defend and empower 
teachers, undoubtedly, an element of selfishness and manipulation existed. Camacho knew, 
along with Cárdenas and previous presidents that a strong relationship, and a coercive one, with 
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a consolidated teachers union would all but guarantee electoral victories for the PNR/PRI in the 
foreseeable future. Teachers were largely seen as cogs in the party machine and they could be 
used to procure votes and to persuade the public to vote the party into power election after 
election (Britton, 1979). 
In exchange for union loyalty the PNR/PRI would provide important posts and positions 
of power for union leaders, and the party would provide liberally to the rank and file in the form 
of increased wages, improved health care, easier and favorable access to loans, and the ability to 
advance within the union (Roett, 1995). This corporatist relationship based itself on a strict 
etiquette of quid-pro-quo politics. This would help to ensure the PNR/PRI’s political dominance 
until the year 2000. 
From its inception, the SNTE has existed as a highly centralized and oligarchic union. 
Functioning essentially as a puppet to the PNR/PRI the SNTE has always been highly 
bureaucratized and union decision making has almost always taken place at the politician level. 
Practices of public assemblies among teachers and the representation of teachers in the form of 
union delegates has merely existed as a symbolic gesture of what a democratic union represents. 
These factors help to show how far the union has come since its beginnings when so much was  
focused on teachers’ rights and educational equality. The growing corporatist system between 
the government and the SNTE would begin to stir the flames of dissent within the union and 
large numbers of union members would begin to more vocally and actively voice concerns and 
indifference. Since the PRI relied so heavily on the SNTE for votes and its influence in getting 
the public to vote for PRI candidates the party needed to address these concerns being raised by 
the membership. Unfortunately, the PRI failed to act and the dissent movement within the SNTE 
continued to strengthen. 
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Rise of the CNTE 
 Growing agitation and indifference to the organizational structure of the SNTE by rank 
and file members soon made it clear that the model of governance exercised by the PRI and 
SNTE leadership could not be sustained without alienating a portion of the union base. Ideals of 
participatory democracy and leadership accountability enforced through bottom-up union 
organization became areas of concern for rank and file members and soon forums and unofficial 
assemblies were being held to address these concerns. Armed with a desire to strip the union of 
its oligarchic structure and corrupt leaders, many in the union base began entertaining the notion 
of forming a new union to challenge the SNTE and delegitimize it (La Botz, 1988). They grew 
tired of the corporatist relationship the union shared with the PRI and the union’s powerlessness 
in promoting change within the sphere of education without having to consult with the PRI. 
 Yet those that desired to break away from the SNTE understood the complexity and near 
impossibility of achieving such an action. For one, the PRI controlled the finances that flowed 
through the SNTE. If the union wanted to invest in any way in education or in its union members 
it would have to go through the PRI. The party functioned as a gate-keeper and used this power 
in a very manipulative way. If dissident members created a new union the PRI could suffocate 
and crush it from the beginning simply by withholding money. Furthermore, any dissent on such 
a large scale would have ultimately been met with the wrath of the PRI. The party had invested 
too much to allow a fissure to appear within the union and the PRI had already shown and 
established its willingness to defer to violence and repression as a way to keep the union in line 
(Cook, 1996). Although the genesis of the PRI was grounded in socialist and leftist ideologies, as 
Mexico continued to modernize and integrate itself into the global economy an increasing 
influence of conservatism made its way into Mexican politics. The proliferation of neoliberalism 
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in the 1980s quickly made its way into Mexico as the government aggressively began to 
privatize the economy. Free trade and increased foreign investment brought newfound profits 
and the expansion of communications had a strong effect in speeding up the westernization of 
Mexican society. Mexico began to experience a new economic relationship with the United 
States in the form of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), massive influx of 
foreign capital which translated into increased wealth for the PRI and its politicians (Johnston, 
2005). Any threat to the stability of the SNTE and its relationship with the PRI was seen as a 
surefire way of compromising these advances and putting in jeopardy the system of hegemony 
constructed by the PRI. 
 Yet those in the union who felt that radical change was necessary continued to press 
forward with the desire to form a faction within the union and a delicate balance had to be made 
if they were to be successful. The dissident teachers understood the PRI’s power, but also knew 
that the PRI desired stability above all and would make some concessions in order to maintain 
that stability. The PRI understood its role and knew that it could keep the new dissident union in 
check through repression and financial austerity. Teachers from the more leftist and indigenous 
southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Guerrero led the charge in breaking away from the 
SNTE (Stephen, 2013). The role of indigeneity played a major part in the southern rebellion. The 
pre-Hispanic practices of public assemblies and usos y costumbres which literally translates as 
uses and customs, a form of government in which communities enjoy political autonomy, were 
essentially romanticized and seen as the ultimate display of true democracy where every voice 
and every vote count. This was the antithesis of the organization of the SNTE which elected 
delegates that represented the different regions of the union in union assemblies. And even there, 
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the delegates many times failed to vote in favor of their constituents, instead deferring to what 
the union leaders and PRI overseers desired. 
 As more rank and file members desired to break away from the system of the SNTE,  
official forums and assemblies were held in Chiapas in 1979 to decide whether or not to establish 
a union faction. By way of consensus, the National Coordinating Committee of Education 
Workers (CNTE) was founded. This body would still remain under the auspices of the SNTE and 
the PRI, but its formation highlighted the chasm that existed within the union from which it 
broke away. The formation of the CNTE was a direct rejection of the status quo and served as a 
statement to the SNTE and PRI that the top-down organization of the union, lack of democracy, 
and centralization of power would not be tolerated. Furthermore, the CNTE signaled that 
growing unrest within the union would eventually serve as a stumbling block to the PRI’s 
position of power. 
 Soon after Chiapas, new locals were formed in the surrounding states of Oaxaca, 
Guerrero, and Michoacán where thousands of teachers joined the CNTE in open rebellion of the 
SNTE-PRI apparatus. Once formed, the CNTE immediately began to focus on funneling power 
through the rank and file members. Instead of a top-down structure the union would rotate it 
horizontally so that the decision-making power was shared among the lowest members to the 
highest-ranking leaders. This newfound autonomy and democracy within the union allowed the 
CNTE to begin to push back against the PRI and the SNTE and build “mass mobilizations, 
strikes, and political struggle” (La Botz, 1988). Soon, the union appeared to be a foil to 
everything the SNTE and PRI wanted to accomplish. The PRI essentially was powerless to react 
to the dissident nature of the CNTE mainly because its base was located in the politically and 
socially unstable southern part of Mexico. Any retaliation by the PRI may have been met with 
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widescale opposition by not only the CNTE and its sympathizers but also the citizens who were 
growing to become critical of the party. The dissident movement quickly strengthened in 
momentum, and the rapid rise in membership posed a serious threat to the SNTE’s ability to 
leverage sanctions or push back against the CNTE. What made the situation more frustrating for 
the SNTE leadership was that the CNTE was technically under its jurisdiction. The CNTE was 
like a rebellious child that could not be disciplined. 
 Within the first years of its existence, the CNTE began to organize mass demonstrations 
comprised of tens of thousands of education workers who marched against the leadership of the 
SNTE (La Botz, 1988). In the Southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Morelos, 
teachers of the CNTE would stage sit-ins and march the hundreds of miles to Mexico City to 
protest for better teaching conditions and wage increases, areas that were neglected for years by 
the SNTE. Soon enough, the CNTE turned its attention to the PRI and began protesting against 
the regime (Hathaway, 2000). As marches and protesting activity increased the PRI began to 
view the CNTE as a legitimate threat to its hegemony. Marches staged in Mexico City would 
grab the attention of the media where anti-PRI propaganda would be disseminated over the air 
waves by the striking teachers. It was not long before the party began to answer back with 
violence and repression. Allegations of abductions, beatings, intimidation, and threats began to 
surface, and it was not uncommon for CNTE leaders to emerge from political meetings only to 
be greeted by PRI hired goons (Hathaway, 2000). 
 As a result, the CNTE began to temper down its protesting somewhat. However, in states 
such as Oaxaca and Chiapas it seemed as if the government repression boiled the teachers’ blood 
even more. Locals of the CNTE soon began to adopt more extreme forms of protesting. Instead 
of sit-ins and public occupations of the zócalo teachers would set up blockades on major avenues 
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and highways and vandalize government buildings (Estrada, 2016). Trying to keep the more 
radical locals under control, the CNTE would send delegates to those states and scold the locals 
for their actions, claiming that what they were doing was hurting the image of the CNTE (Cook, 
1996). But the attempts by the CNTE to reign in the more radical arm of their union proved 
unfruitful, especially in Oaxaca and Chiapas where the seeds of radicalism had long ago been 
planted.    
 
Local 22 Leads the Charge 
 Local 22 of the SNTE has existed in Oaxaca since 1980 when the CNTE was expanded 
there from Chiapas. Beginning with its inception, the local 22 has fought aggressively for 
teachers’ rights and for the defense of public education during a time when the federal 
government pushed for the privatization of public schools and the globalization of Mexico (de la 
Luz, 2015). Indigenous struggles and an indifferent local government have empowered local 22, 
and it now has become regarded as the most radical local within the union. For decades, local 22 
has vehemently protested government corruption, repression, and hypocrisy through large scale 
marches throughout the city, vandalism, and violence against the government and its 
sympathizers. While Marxist ideologies are not anything new within the union, the presence of 
anarchists and other far left organizations and individuals have had an impact on local 22’s 
politics and patience with the government. But arguably, nothing has had as much of an impact 
on local 22’s ideologies as indigeneity and the state’s rich history of indigenous conquest. 
Stories of the Zapotec’s inability to be conquered by Hernán Cortés have reached the 
status of folklore and the romantic and violent tale of the relationship between the Zapotecs and 
Mixtecs told every summer during the state’s Guelaguetza festival captivates those that listen. 
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These histories undoubtedly have influenced Oaxaca’s culture as one of stubborn and 
confrontational people. Local 22 fits this description well. For the last three decades the teachers 
of local 22 have gone on strike every May in Oaxaca City to demand improvements in education 
funding ranging from increased infrastructure spending to increased salaries. The length of the 
strikes fluctuates every year from a few weeks to a few months. During this time the teachers 
setup an encampment in the zócalo of Oaxaca where the large open plaza is dominated by a 
kaleidoscope of colored tarps and tents. From there, members of the local coordinate their 
subsequent actions. For the most part, the state government does not hesitate in conceding to 
some demands in order to get the teachers back in the classrooms. This is done mainly to avoid 
any escalation of social unrest as local 22 is known for its ability to coordinate collective action 
on a large scale and at a moment’s notice. Mega marches, marches comprised of tens of 
thousands of teachers, are a tool used by the union to bring parts of Oaxaca City to a complete 
standstill while thousands of teachers and supporters fill one of the handful of principle avenues, 
snarling traffic and leaving thousands of people stranded as transportation services come to a 
halt. 
One of the effects stemming from local 22’s active resistance is the mercurial relationship 
the state government has with the union. At times the union has enjoyed a mostly positive and 
proactive relationship with the government such as during the governorship of Heladio Ramirez 
who negotiated with local 22 to give the union more control over the State Institute of Public 
Education of Oaxaca (IEEPO). This allowed for the infiltration of union members into the 
government body and increased local 22’s power over the administration of education in Oaxaca. 
Soon after opening up the IEEPO to local 22 the union began to exercise control over who could 
get hired and fired in administration and teaching. The local also exercised control over teacher 
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logistics determining where teachers were to teach and implementing a system whereby teacher 
loyalty to local 22 would be rewarded with placement in coveted school locations or 
administrative positions. Local 22 also controlled the curriculum taught in classrooms. The 
union’s rise to power within the IEEPO quickly established the legitimacy and reality of local 
22’s footprint on education throughout the state (Estrada, 2016). 
The governorship of Jose Murat at the turn of the millennium continued the tradition 
established in the 90s of the state government conceding to many of the demands of local 22. 
Where Ramirez conceded the IEEPO to the local in the mid-90s, Murat’s concessions included 
the resignation of the director of the IEEPO (Braunstein, 2008), essentially opening up a path for 
a complete local 22 takeover of the IEEPO. Once the position of director was occupied by a 
member of local 22 the union could make changes to teachers’ salaries and bonuses. Even today, 
Oaxaca teachers enjoy some of the most liberal benefits of all teachers in the country. Local 22 
teachers and administrators are among the highest paid in the country and enjoy additional 
benefits such as easy access to loan programs and well-paid end of year bonuses called 
aguinaldos (Hugo, 2015; Briseño, 2016). These accomplishments coupled with local 22’s 
progressive organizational model where participatory democracy is practiced as much as 
possible and leaders are held accountable due to a more bottom-up distribution of power have 
strengthened the local’s reputation throughout Mexico and influences other union locals to 
follow its example. 
However, the positive relationship experienced by local 22 in the 90s through the 
beginning of the 2000s would come crashing down as more antagonistic governors pushed back 
against the union through threats and repression. The year 2006, which will be more closely 
examined later on will highlight this shift in policy and treatment of the union. The blow dealt to 
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the union in 2006 was so severe that it has yet to fully recover. Leading up to 2006, however, 
local 22 appeared to occupy the pinnacle of influence and power in Oaxaca. And anytime local 
22 made a move it seemed like the rest of Mexico tuned in to see what local 22 would do. 
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Chapter 2: The Rise of Local 22 
 
Introduction 
If there was a turning point or watershed moment for local 22 that moment would be the 
summer of 2006. The years of protesting and challenging the government in the 1980s, 90s, and 
at the turn of the millennium ultimately prepared the local for the ultimate test, to see whether or 
not the leadership and the rank and file would be ready for the endurance required to maintain a 
movement and oust a government. As mentioned in the previous chapter, local 22’s rise to 
prominence and power was swift and very real. But that rise came at a cost to the local as a result 
of the values established at its founding. Participatory democracy emerged as the foundation on 
which local 22 was established. It represented everything the SNTE was not. Oligarchy, 
corruption, clientelism, corporatism, etc. defined the SNTE and the PRI’s stranglehold on the 
union pushed many within to fight back. Furthermore, Oaxaca’s affinity for democracy comes 
from its DNA. For centuries, indigenous peoples in the state have participated in a system of 
usos y costumbres, a rule of law that relies on democratic participation through public 
assemblies. In communities that practice usos y costumbres, local leadership is selected by the 
community members on the condition of unanimity, community projects are decided, and a 
relatively large amount of political autonomy is granted to the community (Canedo Vásquez, 
2008). Usos y costumbres served as a model for local 22 to follow. 
It is for these reasons that local 22’s shift to oligarchy came unexpectedly to many. In 
2006 it appeared that local 22 and the protest movement would finally usher in a democracy 
where the citizens—those not belonging to the elite class—would control the politics of the state. 
To a certain degree the movement accomplished this objective. In 2010, the first non-PRI 
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candidate was elected governor in more than eighty years (Wilkinson, Ellingwood, 2010). The 
election was seen as an historic moment for democracy, however, even with a new party in 
power the government pressure placed on local 22 continued to increase along with the local’s 
shift to oligarchy. What has not been discussed much is that while local 22 continued to gain 
influence and power in Oaxaca politics during the 1990s and 2000s it was beginning to shift to a 
more oligarchic structure while still maintaining its democracy among the base. However, this 
shift toward oligarchy did not have the effect of undermining the values of the local. Public 
assemblies were still very effective, and the rank and file enjoyed large amounts of 
administrative and political responsibilities (Stephen, 2013). But the increasing growth of the 
local in the form of membership forced it to centralize certain administrative functions and 
bureaucratize. Yet it still was not a true oligarchy in the sense that the leadership centralized its 
power. After all, the rank and file still enjoyed a relatively functional democratic structure where 
it still exercised its authority in deciding many issues facing the local. 
Local 22’s embrace of participatory democracy and the aggressive style in which it 
pushed back against external opposition caught the attention of unions and locals throughout 
Mexico, and later on, throughout Latin America. Aggressively resisting and repudiating decades 
of corporatist and oligarchic structure between the PRI and the SNTE local 22 began to win over 
sympathy from NGOs in Oaxaca and throughout Mexico. Human rights groups and indigenous 
rights groups saw local 22 as a vehicle through which social activism and change could be 
wrought (Larson, 2015). And local 22 did not hesitate to take advantage of these new alliances 
since doing so would only increase the local’s influence in the region. Several factors allowed for 
and facilitated the growth of local 22 into a regional, and then, national influence. This chapter 
will look at some of those factors and investigate how they propelled local 22 to its pinnacle of 
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power and precipitated its demoralizing fall. Furthermore, this chapter will look at how internal 
factors, such as a growing membership base, began the local’s shift to oligarchy and that external 
factors in the form of government repression forced the local to centralize power into the hands 
of the leadership, effectively removing the bottom-up organization it enjoyed. 
 
From CNTE to local 22: a rise to state and national prominence 
 I argue that the following factors influenced the growth of local 22 in both membership 
and political power: the practice of participatory democracy, aggressive resistance to the status 
quo of government-union relations, and an increased focus on cultivating positive relations 
between teachers and community members. When the CNTE was formed in Chiapas in 1979 
many teachers’ sentiments towards the ruling PRI party and the SNTE had reached historic lows. 
The common practices of corporatism and cronyism could no longer be tolerated especially by 
the more progressive and indigenous teachers of the union (Limage, 2013). As such the Chiapas 
movement spread and Oaxaca become fertile ground for its proliferation within the SNTE. Many 
leaders knew within the growing faction that democracy was to be the key to separation from the 
SNTE. Having a union based on participatory democratic values could in no way be compatible 
with the system already in place and would, from its foundation, become antithetical to the 
nature of unionism in Mexico. The movement would chafe against the grain of decades of state 
sanctioned and sponsored unionism. 
 The biggest obstacle to realizing the creation of the CNTE and especially its growth 
during the 1980s and 90s was the political structural apparatus in place. The PRI has been 
referred to as a “perfect dictatorship” (Sheppard, 2016) because it had carefully orchestrated a 
rule of continuous power that covered more than 70 years through a system of intimidation, 
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violence, corruption, and manipulation masked under a façade of democracy. On top of its 
aggressive nature, the PRI flourished under a highly centralized, oligarchic, and extremely 
bureaucratic apparatus. For decades the PRI sanctioned the SNTE and essentially adopted it into 
the party machine utilizing the union’s influence on voters and party loyalty. One of the most 
significant explanations behind the success of the PRI is the influence of the SNTE in mobilizing 
its base and creating grassroots movements crucial in electing PRI candidates across the country. 
By placing itself in opposition to the SNTE, the CNTE essentially placed itself in opposition to 
the PRI as well, for the relationship between the SNTE and PRI had become so intertwined that 
by certain standards they could not be distinguished from one another. PRI leaders had become 
SNTE leaders and vice versa (Saavedra, 2016). This created much friction for the CNTE and 
manifested itself through years of government repression and intimidation. 
 Therefore, when the CNTE surfaced with an ideology rooted in direct democracy, the 
PRI and to an extant the SNTE would not stand by idly. Yet it was the clarion call of the CNTE 
that direct democracy would be the foundation of its platform and that audacity and rebellious 
attitude would begin to galvanize many and make membership within the CNTE an enticing 
option. The ideology of direct democracy took root in Oaxaca where subsequently local 22 
formed. The advantage in Oaxaca is the large indigenous population and legacy. Unique to 
Oaxaca is the practice of usos y costumbres, a system in which municipalities practice their own 
autonomy independent from the state government through a system of public assemblies and 
rotating leadership (Anaya, 2006). A pre-Columbian form of governing in Mexico, Oaxaca’s 
long history of practicing usos y costumbres became imbued in the fabric of Oaxacan culture and 
way of life. Therefore, the practice of participatory democracy within local 22 seemed like a 
natural fit since it would be a continuation of the practice into the sphere of unionism and 
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education in which communities had a strong interest. Local 22 placed a heavy interest in usos y 
costumbres and its membership practiced it within the local (Muñoz, 2005) which helped to 
increase the local’s popularity among not only the indigenous communities of the state but also 
the poor, working class, and progressive populations. One of the teachers I interviewed, Isabel, 
talked about the role usos y costumbres played in legitimizing the local with fellow Oaxacans 
and that it led to an increase in exposure with various NGOs and social justice organizations 
throughout the state which led to the local allying with some of these groups to push for social 
reformation in areas such as women’s and indigenous’ rights. 
 This increased contact with those outside the local helped to strengthen its political power 
because it could count on other groups and organizations to support the local during moments of 
protest. Nowhere can this be seen more than with the relationship between local 22 and citizens 
of the different communities throughout the state. For example, with the formation of the CNTE, 
unionized teachers in Oaxaca quickly consolidated to enter CNTE membership which meant that 
the majority of Oaxaca’s tens of thousands of teachers now belonged to the newly formed local 
22 of the CNTE. This became a significant advantage because almost instantly the CNTE had 
members in hundreds of municipalities in Oaxaca with communities being exposed to the local’s 
ideologies via the teachers. Another advantage that the CNTE exploited was the opportunity to 
build a rapport with community members and more importantly, the parents of students. The 
union leadership saw this as a crucial step in legitimizing the local’s influence in both social and 
political matters because if the local could gain the support and confidence of the people then it 
would be better situated when protest activity and any kind of resistance against the government 
took place. Interviews I conducted of teachers highlight this argument and most of them talk 
about being sent to remote towns and villages where the teacher was really the only connection 
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with the outside world. One teacher, Rafael, spoke about how he was sent to an isolated 
community in the Mixteca region of the state about a six-hour drive from Oaxaca City. Many of 
the children spoke broken Spanish because their parents and others in the community only spoke 
their indigenous dialect. Rafael, who is from the city, said that the community quickly accepted 
and respected him as an authority figure. The parents looked up to Rafael because they saw him 
as someone who would educate their children and give them the opportunity to transcend 
poverty. Rafael’s experience is not unique among teachers sent out to work and live in rural and 
poor communities. That link the teacher formed with the community helped to create a special 
bond with parents and other community members. As parents formed a positive perception of the 
teacher helping their children they also formed a positive perception of local 22. 
 The state’s indigenous population, to which so many of the rural communities belonged, 
benefited greatly from local 22’s presence. Historically a marginalized and repressed people, 
indigenous communities found an ally in local 22 who empathized with the discrimination and 
poverty they faced. For example, prior to the 2006 conflict when local 22 presented the 
government with its list of demands, included was “a proposal to mitigate poverty in Oaxaca’s 
indigenous communities” (Eisenstadt, 2011). More recently local 22 has pushed for the inclusion 
of curriculum that teaches indigenous languages, a stronger focus on indigeneity, and the 
importance of indigenous culture in Mexican history (Rosen-Long, Mayorga, Cox, 2016). As a 
result of defending and promoting indigenous rights local 22 has enjoyed a strong relationship 
with indigenous communities and a large ally in its fight against the government. Local 22 has 
also been involved in protesting projects such as mines that would displace indigenous 
communities and place many others in harm’s way due to the probability of contamination 
(Cencos XXII, 2018), dams such as the proposed dam in the community of Paso de la Reina that 
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would displace the entire community (Tinajero, 2018), and wind farms in the isthmus region of 
the state that have displaced indigenous farmers (Sección XXII y ong’s, 2012). That local 22 has 
been able to support such protests and invest resources into movements outside of education 
shows how much it has grown over the past two decades. This increased influence and presence 
has allowed the local to be more confrontational and aggressive in its demands to the 
government. As the 1990s came to a close, for example, local 22 enjoyed a decade of winning 
government concessions after it had engaged in large-scale protests, marches, and blockades 
throughout the city. By the time of the protest movement of 2006, both the government and the 
local had settled into an annual routine of the local presenting its demands and the government 
making concessions to the majority of them in order to avoid retaliation from the local (Stephen, 
2013). 
 Isidro, one of the teachers I interviewed talked about local 22’s success in pressuring the 
government for concessions. 
Before Ortiz (Governor during the protest movement of 2006) we were able to intimidate 
the governor by threatening to shut schools down, march, block off the city center, and 
create an atmosphere of chaos. We had more than 60,000 teachers and the governor 
didn’t want to have to deal with all of the problems we could create in the city. So when 
we presented our demands we would occupy the zócalo for a few days, maybe a week or 
two, before we would go back to our homes and communities because we received 
concessions to enough of the demands we presented…The governor couldn’t fight back 
against us because we also had many allies that would support us had the government 
answered us with repression or sanctions…That’s what happened in 2006, Ortiz attacked 
us and we answered back with APPO. 
 
Isidro’s account helps to highlight local 22’s success in creating alliances and establishing itself 
as a formidable presence for the government to go against. His mention of APPO highlights this. 
When local 22 presented its demands and Governor Ortiz responded with repression the local 
joined with organizations throughout Oaxaca and Mexico and in a matter of days created the 
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APPO which successfully took control of all functions of Oaxaca City for nearly six months. The 
national and international response to the conflict highlighted the prominence of local 22 that 
unions and organizations not only in Mexico but abroad expressed their support and solidarity 
with local 22. 
 Arguably, what solidified local 22’s climb to influence and cemented its power in local 
politics was its success in establishing its members throughout the different administration levels 
of the IEEPO (State Institute of Public Education of Oaxaca). In 1992, then Governor Heladio 
Ramirez was trying to restructure the PRI’s image which had become tainted with accusations of 
corruption from previous governors. In the decade before Ramirez was sworn in as governor, 
Oaxaca had seen five different governors lead the state (Corro, 2014). Ramirez, who is from the 
Mixteca region of Oaxaca, relied on his populist ideologies and sympathies to rebuild alliances 
in the state. One of his groups of focus was the indigenous population, and the other was the 
teachers. In the late eighties the federal government pushed forward with a plan to decentralize 
education throughout the country which was met with stiff resistance by teachers unions. In 
Oaxaca, local 22 staged protests and pressured the state government to not decentralize since the 
fear of decentralization was the loss of influence held by the local. Ramirez, a member of the 
PRI, found himself in a precarious situation. He was to maintain his loyalty to the PRI, which 
was the party in power at the time, all the while not alienating his Oaxacan constituents. Local 22 
made it known to Ramirez that they were ready to mobilize in any way to prevent 
decentralization from taking place and Ramirez’s support of indigeneity conflicted with 
decentralization of education which would arguably further alienate indigenous children by 
decreasing their chances of obtaining an education. One of the more formidable fears associated 
with decentralization was decreased government oversight of education and the proliferation of 
58 
 
the privatization of education, an issue that has resurfaced in the last decade with a new wave of 
education reforms signed into law by President Peña Nieto. Ramirez made a compromise. To 
prevent the union from mobilizing against decentralization, Ramirez created the IEEPO which 
would act as the administrative branch that would oversee education in the state.  
When local 22 signed the “Minuta de 1992” (Bill of 1992) with Governor Ramirez, the 
bill established a partnership with the state government that allowed for the local to occupy the 
IEEPO and establish an indelible mark that would become a fixture in Oaxaca politics up 
through the present (Puma, 2016). This new partnership gave local 22 the opportunity to fill the 
IEEPO with loyal union members who quickly took over important administrative positions that 
controlled nearly every aspect of education in the state. By the end of the decade, local 22 had 
control over what teachers were hired, where they were placed, who was fired, what educational 
curriculum to introduce, and the distribution of resources to the different schools throughout the 
state. Essentially, the only area out of reach for local 22 was control over funding. The 
government relinquished some control over how the IEEPO functioned and local 22’s changes to 
curriculum, for example, went uncontested (Saavedra, 2016). As a result, local 22’s political 
power strengthened dramatically. But this also placed local 22 in an inseparable relationship, and 
a corporatist one, with the government where the local’s decisions were now not entirely 
autonomous. 
Doubtless, this corporatist relationship influenced local 22 to adopt some oligarchic 
tendencies, especially bureaucratization and specialization. The government had handed over the 
entire apparatus that oversaw education in the state to local 22, and it was forced to fill hundreds 
of administrative positions. Furthermore, as local 22’s presence and influence in the IEEPO 
increased, it began to centralize more power into the hands of the top administrators of the 
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IEEPO. Yet, as local 22 continued to grow in the IEEPO and move toward a more centralized 
leadership structure, the local did not relinquish its practice of democracy, and the rank and file 
continued to wield influence. Local 22’s success in occupying the IEEPO was no small feat and 
its effects have been felt ever since (Stephen, 2013). By controlling the state’s education 
apparatus local 22 found itself with much more negotiating power. At times, the state 
government had its arms tied behind its back unable to resist local 22’s demands. But the 
takeover of the IEEPO in a way forced local 22 to adopt oligarchic tendencies by drastically 
increasing the administrative responsibilities of the local, which, along with a growing 
membership, pressured the local to bureaucratize in order to maintain efficiency. 
 
The beginnings of oligarchy 
 While founded on strong principles of democracy, factors within the union pressured it to 
begin a slow shift toward oligarchy. Indigeneity, for example, has historically played a 
significant role within local 22, and the disparate cultures and ideologies that it injects into the 
local should help to maintain the local’s democratic tendencies. Social scientists have argued in 
favor of this when looking at oligarchization within organizations. One of the more well-known 
studies is that of Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) who looked at the International 
Typographical Union (ITU) and how it seemingly defied Michels’ Iron Law in that it never quite 
become completely oligarchical. One of the factors that the authors studied was how the 
existence of factions within the ITU helped to keep the leadership in check by challenging the 
leadership anytime a faction felt that the leadership was overstepping the power it possessed. 
Anytime a faction felt that the leadership was beginning to undermine the democratic values in 
any way the faction would call out the leadership and hold it accountable (1956).  
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 Much like the ITU, the existence of factions within local 22 has historically helped it to 
remain democratic. Oaxaca’s diverse and rich history grounded in indigeneity ensures a more 
varied presence of ideologies within the local, and a broad gamut of beliefs can be found among 
the membership of the local. Teachers that identify as indigenous and especially if they come 
from indigenous communities will bring ideologies such as usos y costumbres with them into the 
local (Sorroza, Danielson, 2013), and many hold the belief that a community’s fate lies in the 
hands of its members. An integral element of usos y costumbres is the public assembly where 
members of the community come together to vote on issues within the community. There are no 
delegates or representatives in these public assemblies. Each member of the community has a say 
and consensus is required in order for a project to be realized or a decision to be made. Activities 
such as the tequio, where members of a neighborhood or community work together to 
accomplish a neighborhood or community project such as digging a well, paving a road, 
installing street lights, or performing maintenance of a school, originate from indigenous 
practices. The purpose of the tequio is to establish accountability among the members of the 
community, to serve the needs of the community, and to create an atmosphere of solidarity and 
shared experience that would strengthen community bonds. The large-scale protests put on by 
local 22 can be compared to a tequio in that all the members of the community (local 22 
membership) work together on a shared goal. Participation at the marches, for example, creates a 
sense of solidarity among the members and the fact that members are required to participate in 
the marches mirrors the level of accountability seen at the tequio. The ejido—an area of land that 
is shared and farmed by a community of which no one person owns—also originates from 
indigenous practices and it is this belief in the collective that indigenous teachers have brought 
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with them into the local. Collective action forms the base of indigenous culture in Oaxaca, and to 
an extent, the base of local 22 culture. 
 Indeed, so influential has been indigeneity within local 22 that many of its practices have 
been adopted from indigenous beliefs. The public assembly became one of the defining 
characteristics of the local and the closest replication of a participatory democracy. Each 
delegation within the local has held public assemblies to ensure that every teacher that wants to 
be heard is heard and that every teacher casts a direct vote to determine policy and union action. 
Delegations are afforded individual autonomy and allowed to make collective decisions to 
determine actions for their respective jurisdictions. The prevalence of local 22 members that 
identify as indigenous has influenced the union through votes in public assemblies to take up 
such issues as distributing literature in different dialects, establishing programs in schools to 
teach indigenous languages such as Zapotec, Mixtec, and Mixe as a way to fight back against the 
government’s push to provide all teaching in Spanish, and to recognize and advocate for 
indigenous rights (Stephen, 2013). All of this has helped to maintain and disseminate the local’s 
progressive ideologies.  
While indigeneity has had a significant influence on local 22 it has not held a monopoly 
on ideologies. A thriving population of anarchists, communists, Marxists, capitalists, and Priistas 
(members loyal to the PRI) have co-existed and found ways to work together on shared goals. 
No doubt these disparate ideologies facilitate conflict within the local, but historically those 
conflicts have been superseded by broader educational and social issues. These factions of 
ideologies within the local historically have functioned much like those of the ITU in that they 
have helped to prevent major corruption from overtaking the local by holding the leadership 
accountable for its actions especially during elections. Union leaders have more or less been kept 
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in check. Ironically, however, this diversity of ideologies which has historically helped to keep 
local 22 democratic has more recently become one of the characteristics that has pushed the local 
toward oligarchy. 
 This seems to be case especially following the conflict of 2006 where government 
repression and political pressure significantly weakened the local. Data from the interviews I 
conducted support this argument. For example, one of the teachers I interviewed, Victor, talks 
about how the instability within the local pressured the leadership to tighten its grip on power. 
Well, I would say that the leadership needed to focus on maintaining the existence of the 
syndicate after everything that happened in 2006. The union was hurt. APPO fell apart 
and the union invested a lot of resources into it. The government continued to attack, and 
the union was barely surviving. One of the reasons APPO fell apart was because no 
consensus could ever be made on how to move forward. A lot of that had to do with the 
many different ideologies present within the union and the leadership couldn’t risk the 
same catastrophe to happen within [local] 22. 
 
Victor’s argument is intriguing in that it looks at how conflict can shift priorities. It would be 
understandable that local 22 leadership would do all in its power to limit the freedom of the 
different factions within the local because the last thing the local needs is for conflict in 
ideologies to further destabilize an already weakened local. Additionally, the difficult situation 
that local 22 was placed in during the government repression may very well have prevented the 
rank and file from even engaging in debate regarding different ideologies and which ones would 
be most beneficial to the local. Either way, the fact is that local 22 leadership assumed a great 
deal of control over the local without receiving opposition from the rank and file for its actions, 
whereas historically, this would not have been the case.  
Although indigeneity and factions played a role after 2006 in the oligarchization of local 
22, it was in the 1990s when local 22 began to plant the seeds that would allow the local to shift 
toward oligarchy. The decade of the eighty’s, which began with the formation of the CNTE and 
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subsequently local 22, was then followed by quick growth of local 22 since the local became the 
only established representation the teachers had in Oaxaca. As a result, membership increased 
dramatically and local 22 grew throughout the state. Not only was its presence made in the 
capital, but also in the Isthmus, Mixteca, and Cañada regions, along with the coast. Enthusiasm 
for the movement caught on quickly, and soon local 22 became a model of resistance and 
democracy within the CNTE for other locals to emulate. As the SNTE continued to receive 
criticism due to its relationship with the PRI, local 22 led protests against both organizations in 
Oaxaca and Mexico City. But as the eighties came to a close local 22 was looking at the next 
phase of its growth. In order for the local to wield the influence and clout that it would later on 
be known for it needed to significantly alter the dynamics of power in Oaxaca and the local’s 
relationship it had with the state government. 
 As explored thus far, many factors contributed to the growth of local 22 and 
distinguished it from most of the other locals within the CNTE. While local 22 experienced 
significant success in acquiring many of its demands, its rapid growth and aggressive style of 
mobilizations pressured the local to maintain tight control over its operations resulting in the 
practice of some of the very issues the local and CNTE had fought so hard to reject. An 
oligarchic structure and corruption began to seep into the local bringing with it new challenges 
not so much from without but from within. The biggest manifestation of this is the toll the shift 
has taken on the rank and file. The level of trust that the base has towards the leadership has 
withered since 2006 according to the interviews I conducted. Noe, a former regional local 22 
leader who served in that position after 2006 had this to say regarding the relationship. “I became 
disillusioned with the leaders during my service as a regional delegate. I saw how the leadership 
put their interests first—and what were those interests? They wanted to remain in their current 
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positions and they did what was necessary to accomplish it. There is no doubt that the leadership 
is negotiating with the government behind our backs, making deals to ensure that they remain in 
power” (personal communication, 2016). These feelings of disillusionment and betrayal are not 
limited to Noe. Other interviewees expressed similar opinions highlighting a feeling of 
disconnection between the leadership and the rank and file.  
 Another factor that helped to plant the seeds of oligarchy was the structure of public 
assemblies and how it could hinder the allocation and provision of resources the local had to 
distribute. This was especially true in the 1980s and 1990s when public assemblies were more 
democratic. The organization of local 22 is as follows: the state of Oaxaca is divided into sectors 
and within those sectors are delegations. There are thirty-seven sectors in Oaxaca state and 
various delegations within each sector. Each delegation participates in assemblies where all 
union members of that delegation participate and vote on different measures and discuss 
different needs. Many delegations consist of a few hundred members. Each delegation elects 
representatives that attend a state level congress of local 22. It is at this congress that final 
decisions are voted on and taken to union leadership for action (Stephen, 2013). These meetings 
can be tedious. Many times, public assemblies of delegations would run into the early morning 
hours of the following day. But such has been the sacrifice the teachers have been willing to 
make to ensure that their democracy functions correctly.  
Diego, one of the teachers I interviewed, talked about an assembly he attended with his 
delegation that lasted for three days. Oscar, another teacher I interviewed who was voted to be 
secretary general on a committee that represented his delegation talked about congress 
assemblies that would last for hours ending many times at four or five in the morning. While 
union members feel that these assemblies provide an opportunity for all to speak their minds the 
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process can be quite cumbersome and physically taxing. Many times, emotions run high and 
enemies are made within the union. Yet this complicated structure of representation makes 
participatory democracy as authentic as possible for the tens of thousands of union members in 
Oaxaca. Many of the teachers I interviewed expressed confidence in this structure of 
representation and that they felt their voices were heard and taken into account. In this way the 
most pressing needs of each delegation was consulted and brought forth to the governing body of 
the local. This helped to keep the attention of union leadership from skewing more toward urban 
delegations and leaving the needs of the more rural teachers unattended which is exactly what 
had taken place on the state and federal levels. 
 The tradeoff by having this type of system is that the process of implementing changes or 
allocating resources becomes increasingly bogged down because there are so many different 
interests at play. Historically, local 22 has been a strictly bottom-up organization in that the rank-
and-file wielded control over decisions made by the local and the practice of usos y costumbres 
was used as a model for governing. The leadership existed to merely realize those decisions 
made by the local’s base (Cook, 1996). But as local 22 grew in both membership and political 
power, the ability to more efficiently manage the local’s decisions became more of a priority and 
the leadership needed to find a way to streamline some of the more pressing issues facing the 
union. One way to do this was to increase the union’s focus on mobilization and protests against 
the government. Noe, one of the teachers interviewed has this to say regarding the centralization 
of power in the union. 
Leading up to the movement of 2006 the union had invested more focus and resources 
into anti-government mobilizations. It seemed that the scale and frequency of protest 
activity increased especially under the governorship of Ruiz [Ortiz]. Instead of occupying 
the zócalo and organizing marches we were also shutting down major avenues and 
supermarkets really trying to cripple the infrastructure that kept Oaxaca moving. 
Participating in this brought us teachers closer together and created a stronger sense of 
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comradery and shared purpose. We felt that we had taken on a larger cause meant to 
change the social structures in place…At assemblies it was easier to talk about 
mobilizations against Ruiz and it seemed that the different delegations felt the same 
way…We aligned more with what the union leadership desired regarding the removal of 
Ruiz and an increased presence of resistance. 
 
By focusing on mobilizing against the government through more aggressive methods of protest 
to acquire concessions the leadership was able to strengthen the level of trust felt by the rank and 
file and increase morale which was very strong up until the end of the 2006 conflict. Essentially, 
the rank and file felt that their interests were the leadership’s interests. 
 It appeared that the strategy Noe mentioned paid off because it became much easier for 
the leadership to make decisions for the rank and file without directly consulting with them 
which was seen more conspicuously at the negotiating table with the state government. But as 
the local’s rank and file placed more confidence in its leadership it became much easier for the 
leaders to pursue their own interests because of the high level of trust they enjoyed from the rank 
and file. It was uncommon for the rank and file to hold the leadership accountable for its actions 
because they felt that whatever the leadership decided to do was in the best interest of the union. 
In retrospect, some of the teachers I interviewed feel that the leadership used the protests against 
Ortiz to deceive the rank and file in order to provide a cover through which they could prioritize 
their interests at the expense of the rank and file. 
 For all of the strength and progress local 22 made leading up to the movement of 2006 
much of it was wiped out by the end of the year. The movement exposed fissures and negative 
sentiments within the union that had up to that point not made themselves manifest in any 
significant ways. There had always been teachers within the local that voiced displeasure with 
the direction the local had taken. They felt that the core beliefs of local 22 had been undermined 
and that the union leadership had crossed the line and taken too much power for themselves 
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leaving little to the base. Many of these concerns failed to transcend the delegation assemblies. 
The union leadership carefully organized and manipulated groups within the local that 
intimidated and silenced detractors. After the collapse of the movement of 2006 there was too 
much opposition and disillusion within the local that there was no way to silence it. Furthermore, 
the collapse of the movement helped to expose the degree to which local 22 had become 
centralized and oligarchic. 
 What these events help to show is the underlying power struggle taking place within the 
local. This can be seen in 2006 and subsequent years where the actions of local 22 were decided 
on by the leadership, many times leaving the rank and file in the dark. A more complicated 
structure of bureaucracy such as the creation of sectors, delegations, and delegation 
representatives that assist the state-level congress allows for a lot of voted on issues to become 
lost in the vacuum of the bureaucracy. Yet, the structure in place does support the argument that 
the union only centralized and bureaucratized to the extent necessary to function more 
efficiently. Arguably, the leadership was still invested in providing as authentic of a participatory 
democratic experience as possible for the rank and file. Contrary to what has been explained, I 
believe that the centralization of power and bureaucratization are not the main factors behind 
local 22’s shift to a more absolute oligarchy—the reason being that the local still displayed a 
significant amount of democracy and accountability of the leadership throughout the 1990s even 
as the local began to adopt oligarchic tendencies. It seems more realistic that the factors behind 
the local’s shift to oligarchy point toward the increased repression against the union by the 
government. This factor, which will be explored more in-depth next chapter, contributed more to 
the shift to oligarchy than anything else because the effectiveness and existence of the union 
depended on weathering government pressure and maintaining its legitimacy. 
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Chapter 3: Violence, Repression, and a Shift to Oligarchy 
 
Introduction 
As explored in the previous chapter, local 22 clearly shifted from a purely democratic 
organization—where before the rank and file possessed significant influence in the trajectory of 
the local—to a more centralized and bureaucratic structure where the leadership apparatus had 
undertaken a larger share of the decision-making responsibilities. Some of the most important 
decisions facing the local: distribution of funds, allocation of resources, drafting a list of requests 
to present to the government, when to strike, where to strike, how long to strike, etc. now rested 
in the hands of the secretary general and his administration (Saavedra, 2016). 
 But while local 22 fits within Michels’ theory of oligarchization, the forces behind the 
local’s shift to oligarchy do not match up cleanly with Michels’ argument. Yes, local 22 has 
become a behemoth, claiming more than 80,000 members in Oaxaca alone, and yes, as a result it 
has had to bureaucratize and centralize in order to more effectively operate with such a large 
membership, but this does not necessarily mean that centralization and bureaucratization led to 
the strong oligarchic structure within local 22 today. As mentioned, in the decades of the 80s and 
90s when the local had a membership in the tens of thousands, rank and file members enjoyed a 
great amount of influence and decision-making power within the union. My interviews with 
teachers show that it was not the secretary general who decided when to strike, but the rank and 
file let the secretary general know that they were going to strike, and they let the Secretary 
General know what they needed from the local to carry out their decision. It was not the 
Secretary General and his administration that created a list of demands to present to the governor 
but the rank and file who then handed the list to the Secretary General to be presented to the 
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governor. The Secretary General merely acted as the union representative. The local effectively 
functioned as a bottom-up organization where democracy ensured that the rank and file decided 
on the actions and procedures of the local (Saavedra, 2016). Local 22’s ability to maintain 
democracy notwithstanding a large membership number attests to its resilience and tenacity in 
maintaining its core beliefs. 
 
Political pressure and government repression as the explanation for oligarchy in local 22 
 Very little research exists on the influence of external factors that influence an 
organization to become oligarchic. Most have to do with internal variables. One of the most 
relevant studies that looks at external factors affecting organizational trajectories comes from 
Ash and Zald (1966) who look at how movement organizations respond to “the ebb and flow of 
the sentiment of the larger society” and how the movement organization’s relations with other 
movement organizations influences whether or not the organization becomes more conservative 
and oligarchical. Their study directly challenges Michels’ and Weber’s model that argues that the 
internal factors that lead to organizational maintenance always push toward conservatism and 
oligarchy. But the authors stop short of suggesting that society and other movement 
organizations influence an organization enough to become oligarchic. Instead, they focus on 
external influences on the existence of the organization and whether or not those influences lead 
to conservatism. However, the Ash and Zald study provides a good starting point when looking 
at local 22.  
What makes local 22 unique is that it possesses most of the characteristics Lipset and 
Handelman found in their research of successfully democratic unions who, according to Michels’ 
theory, should have become oligarchic but did not. Local 22 is made up of a highly educated 
70 
 
membership where conflicting ideologies are very much alive creating factions within the local. 
Autonomy has been the foundation on which the local came into being and participatory 
democracy existed as an absolute truth that formed the identity of the local. Yet, local 22 did not 
follow the same trajectory as the ITU and the SME. It shifted more toward oligarchy and quite 
rapidly, especially in the 2000s. What this chapter attempts to look at is the factors that 
precipitated the local’s shift to become more oligarchic. The reason for this is that local 22’s 
experience seems to be unique since it does not quite fit within the framework Michels offers. 
While Michels argues that internal factors such as organizational growth, the need for specialized 
positions within the organization, bureaucratization, and the need for professional leadership 
push an organization toward oligarchy, the experience in Oaxaca suggests that external factors 
more than internal ones pushed local 22 toward oligarchy. Government repression and political 
pressure applied to the local created a situation in which the local needed to consolidate power in 
order to survive. In fact, I argue that the repression (both violent and non-violent) instilled a 
sense of fear among local 22 members which then led to decreased participation in local 22 
movements and pushed the leaders to assume more control over the local. The aim of this 
chapter is to further explore this phenomenon and explain how it influenced the oligarchization 
of local 22. 
It is not surprising that the local’s shift to oligarchy began in haste following the conflict 
of 2006. The government repression inflicted on the teachers that year was unprecedented. 
Officially, nearly two dozen teachers were killed from June to November, and unofficially many 
more casualties went unreported. The government, with the help of federal entities, brought an 
atmosphere of terror and violence that would haunt many of the protestors for years after the 
events. It was not just the physical violence but also the emotional and psychological violence 
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that destabilized the movement and brought it to an end. Teachers witnessing riot police beating 
and raping women, arresting peaceful protestors and sending them off to maximum security 
prisons, the emergence of the death squads (police and other vigilantes) that patrolled the streets 
at night and fired at teachers keeping watch over the barricades or occupying the radio stations, 
led many teachers to question their involvement in the movement and in the union itself. 
Macrina, who was present at one the of radio stations in the city that she and other teachers were 
using to broadcast propaganda detailed an experience she had one night with the death squads: 
We were outside the radio the station, me and a few other teachers, keeping watch while 
the broadcast was going out over the airwaves. It was night and the neighborhood we 
were in, which was next to a large field on one side and a university campus on the other, 
was quiet. It must have been around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. when we heard a vehicle 
approaching quickly. As it turned the corner we knew that it wasn’t one of ours because it 
was a large SUV and none of the teachers or protestors drove anything like that. Before 
we really had any time to react I heard gunshots and the car drove away as fast as it came. 
I heard a lot of yelling and realized that one of the teachers was shot. He was laying on 
the ground and had a hard time breathing right. One of the other teachers with us ran 
inside the radio station to let everyone know what happened, since one of the functions of 
the radio was to broadcast any movements the police or any sympathizers were making to 
alert the other protestors. 
 
Macrina’s experience was nothing out of the ordinary. Many teachers and others involved in the 
protests related similar accounts of violence and injustices (Stephen, 2013). Mirna, another 
teacher present during the conflict of 2006 related her fears and those of her coworkers as they 
witnessed the brutality of the police against the protestors. 
The reports continued to circulate that a barricade was attacked in some part of the city 
one night and teachers getting shot at in another. Soon enough I talked with teachers who 
wouldn’t stay outside after dark anymore. They would instead go home or stay indoors 
with a friend or sympathizer until the morning. I wouldn’t be outside at night and I 
remember talking with other teachers, questioning our role in the conflict. We wondered 
if it wouldn’t be better to be done with movement. It didn’t seem worth it to stay in the 
union if it meant more of the violence we were experiencing. 
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The long months of repression were effective in shaking many of the teachers’ faith in the 
movement and causing them to question whether or not activism within local 22 was worth it 
anymore. The government’s decision to use repression to weaken the union was effective in this 
sense, and the tactic was used again in 2016 when federal police shot at protestors in Nochixtlán, 
about an hour north-west of Oaxaca City, killing at least eight. These events exposed a 
precarious reality for the local in that membership commitment was wavering and the state 
government engaged in an overt campaign to severely weaken the local. A strong centralized 
leadership was needed to manage the situation, maintain some type of order, and maximize 
damage control. 
 While violence functioned as the most extreme form of repression that threatened the 
local, the government also resorted to non-violent forms of pressure to destabilize local 22. Not 
more than a month after the end of the 2006 conflict, the SNTE, in cooperation with the PRI, 
created a new teachers union in the state. Local 59 was formed as a direct challenger to local 22. 
One of its main objectives was to precipitate a large number of defections from local 22 to local 
59. To do this, the plan was simple. The state government would give preferential treatment to 
local 59 and provide it with the funding and resources that local 22 demanded for every year and 
claimed to not get. Although local 22 had become much more well known for its political 
influence and protests, at its core it concerns itself with education and every year that the local 
presents its demands to the government the majority of the demands call for funding for students 
and schools. As a result, this has led to violent conflicts between the two locals as local 22 
accuses 59 of being a puppet of the PRI and 59 accusing 22 of systemic corruption (Garcia, 
2017; Cruz, 2018). Roberto, the director of an NGO in Oaxaca that has worked with local 22 and 
local 59 explained the tense relationship: 
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What I noticed as I worked with each local is that local 59 would largely avoid the red 
tape that has always plagued local 22. It’s not like local 22 just fills out a form and 
solicits financial help from the government and within a reasonable amount of time the 
grant or whatever financial aid is available to use. The process is cumbersome in many 
regards. Sometimes, years go by without receiving a cent of the solicited amount and that 
is part of the reason for the protests every year. Local 59, on the other hand, seems to not 
experience the same red tape and snail-paced response to petitions. Quite quickly, 
relatively speaking, does the government respond to the requests of local 59. 
 
And as predicted, this has created a wedge between the two locals that continues to divide them. 
The prospect of more financial support, more stable pay, and a quicker response by the 
government has been effective in luring teachers over from local 22. Paty, an elementary school 
teacher in the Isthmus region of Oaxaca talked about being recruited to join local 59 and how 
some of her colleagues left local 22. “I had some friends from [local] 22 that made the switch to 
[local] 59. They mentioned to me how the local is treated well by the government because the 
funding requests it solicits are quickly answered. They talked to me of teachers in the more rural 
parts of the states who had more access to resources the students could use. This was all foreign 
to me given my experience in [local] 22 where it was a struggle to get approval for more paper in 
the classroom. Everything was a struggle and we were forced to mobilize as a result.” 
It is clear that the tactics employed by both local 59 and the government function to sow 
instability and factions within local 22 with the intention of debilitating it. This may sound 
somewhat counterintuitive given Michels’ and others’ argument that factions help to prevent an 
organization from becoming oligarchic. Without empirical data it is hard to see whether or not 
this is the case, but interviews suggest that this has been effective to a degree. By recruiting 
teachers to defect to local 59 the government has created a dilemma that local 22 leadership has 
struggled to resolve. 
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 As mentioned in chapter two, local 22 may have precipitated its shift to oligarchy or at 
least planted the seeds to do so with the co-signing of the 1992 bill with Governor Ramirez. In 
the bill the state government opened the way for local 22 to occupy many of the highest-level 
administrative posts in the IEEPO, essentially giving local 22 control over many facets of 
education in the state. There are two reasons why this partnership arguably influenced local 22’s 
initial shift toward oligarchy. The first is that it opened up a new expansion of administrative 
responsibilities that necessitated a more bureaucratic structure to be able to carry out the newly 
obtained responsibilities. Hundreds of administrators were needed to staff the IEEPO in a full-
time occupation. The other reason stems from the purging of local 22 members from the IEEPO, 
which perhaps crippled local 22 more than the repression of 2006.  
During the 2006 conflict, local 22 along with other organizations in the state demanded 
for the resignation of Governor Ortiz from office. When it was clear that Ortiz was not going 
anywhere the local decided that it would use the gubernatorial election in 2010 to oust him—a 
tall order at the time since the PRI had continuously ruled Oaxaca for more than seventy years. 
However, Ortiz’s dismal approval ratings and the debacle that was the 2006 conflict proved too 
much for the PRI to overcome, and for the first time in seven decades a non-PRI candidate won 
the election. Gabino Cue won the support of the local since he was seen as the competitor to the 
PRI and he promised a transparent and more understanding and mutual relationship with local 
22. He promised to sit at the negotiating table and work out a solution that would satisfy both 
parties (Saavedra, 2016). 
 Yet, in 2012 with the election of the PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto to the presidency, 
a renewed focus on education reform took hold and the CNTE and local 22 saw this as a direct 
attack on the union’s legitimacy. For one, local 22 saw the reform as a way for the government to 
75 
 
take control of the union by deciding which teachers remain and which are fired. By enforcing a 
test that all teachers would have to take in order to measure teacher aptitude, the government 
would be forcing the local to give up some of its power. Furthermore, many within the union saw 
the reforms as a euphemism for an attack on organized labor and an assault to break up the 
CNTE and local 22 since the government would be re-taking control of key aspects of education 
such as the dismissal of teachers. Cue largely avoided involvement in the conflict and did little if 
anything to prevent the administration of the education reforms in Oaxaca. The union decried the 
reforms as an all-out assault on teachers, that it would lead to a labor shortage in schools and be 
detrimental to the educational opportunities of rural students who were predominately poor and 
indigenous (Levinson, 2014). 
 Local 22 voiced opposition that the reforms were meant to eradicate the local and replace 
it with non-unionized teachers working under a largely privatized education system (Cencos 
XXII, 2015). As a result, massive resistance to the reforms became the rallying cry. Large-scale 
mobilizations in the form of marches, sit-ins , and blockades became commonplace and Oaxaca 
was one of the only states to not implement the reforms when they rolled out across the country. 
The government threatened to fire thousands of teachers in Oaxaca for failure to comply to the 
reforms, but local 22 merely dug its heels in deeper. 
 Yet the education reforms were merely a precursor to what would really shake up local 
22 and leave it discombobulated for the foreseeable future. Governor Cue’s decision to purge the 
IEEPO of local 22 in 2016 and replace it with employees from local 59 and others more 
sympathetic to the government dealt a blow to local 22 that nearly crippled it. My interview with 
Oscar highlights the chaos and the powerlessness of the union in rectifying the situation that 
transpired. He talked of losing his job at the IEEPO along with hundreds of other workers and 
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not being contacted by the union for days afterwards. For many of his colleagues reintegration 
into the education system afterwards was unattainable and they eventually found work in other 
fields. Local 22 was never able to respond to Cue’s actions which was a significant departure 
from other moments when the local reacted with massive mobilizations and protests. It seemed 
that the local’s hands were tied behind its back, leadership was limited in what it could do, and 
feelings of betrayal grew among the rank-and-file. About this same time other teachers reported 
that their paychecks were held. One teacher, Lupita, was directly affected and talked about her 
experience: 
I went to the offices to retrieve my check and I was told that there were no checks to give. 
The government had held back the checks and wasn’t paying us because of a discrepancy 
on our teaching license that said we were not titled to teach. I figured that the union 
would take care of the issue by clarifying the discrepancy. But days turned into weeks, 
and weeks turned into months, and more than a year went by without receiving a 
paycheck even though I was still working. Some of my colleagues couldn’t continue 
working so long without pay and so they quit their jobs and found work in something 
else. After about a year and a half I was finally able to receive my checks, but not after 
countless paperwork and visits to government offices. I feel like the union let us down. 
But I do believe that it helped us as much as it could, the problem was that it was also 
trying to navigate the effects of Cue’s actions. 
 
The government waged an all-out assault on local 22 and it enjoyed a significant amount of 
success. In 2016 the police successfully obtained a warrant for the arrest of Ruben Nunez, 
Secretary General of local 22, for corruption charges (Graham, Barrera, and de Jesus, 2016). 
Coupled with the violence in Nochixtlán that same year, local 22 faced a situation that called into 
question its viability as a labor organization. The relentless attacks it suffered at the hands of the 
government placed a strain among the rank-and-file. 
 While political pressure had an effect on the local’s shift to oligarchy, government 
repression magnified that effect. Historically, government repression was nothing new to the 
local, and it used the repression to emerge more unified and defiant, but the scale of government 
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repression against Local 22 had not been seen on this level before 2006. What differentiated 
2006 from prior years was the brutality and violence that led to numerous deaths and the jailing 
and torture of hundreds more. All of the teachers I interviewed recalled with vivid detail police 
beating unarmed teachers—some of them mothers in front of their children, setting fire to 
teachers’ belongings, ransacking the teachers’ possessions in the zócalo, shooting at retreating 
protestors, and rounding up teachers and arresting them en masse. Divina, who was at the zócalo 
the morning the first attack took place described the carnage she witnessed. 
There was so much commotion and smoke from the tear gas the police were shooting at 
us. They came in and quickly surrounded us, setting fire to our encampment. I remember 
seeing police with their batons beating men and women as they tried to run away. Others 
were dragged away in handcuffs. Teachers were running in every direction with many of 
them trying to escape and find refuge at the union offices. The zócalo looked like it had 
been bombed. There was trash and debris everywhere and smoke from the fires filled the 
air. 
  
Many of those teachers arrested were sent off to maximum security prisons in other parts of the 
country and were not heard from for months (Aibar, 2008). Throughout the occupation of 
Oaxaca from June to November paramilitary groups known as death squads by the teachers and 
other protestors would patrol the city streets firing at protestors, destroy barricades and terrorize 
those on the streets who appeared to be sympathetic to the movement. One interviewee, Macrina, 
recalled how one of these death squads began to shoot at a small radio station she and other 
teachers were broadcasting from. One of the men with her was shot and killed. The constant 
terror demoralized a portion of the movement and many teachers and others involved in the 
conflict refused to leave their homes. 
 After the 2006 conflict ended the sense of fear continued as vivid memories of the 
violence haunted protestors. Teachers refused to participate in subsequent marches out of a fear 
of being attacked and the level of impunity with which the military and police acted demoralized 
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the movement and deflated any significant plans to continue mobilizing (Pansters, 2012). Isabel, 
another teacher interviewed, highlighted the psychological effects of this issue: 
After the violence of 2006 we were fearful of what the government could do to us. We 
saw people killed and we heard about hundreds of other teachers who were beaten 
severely. There are other teachers I know who have disappeared. I nor anybody else has 
heard from them. Many were taken by helicopters and sent off to prisons far from 
Oaxaca. Reports of women being raped by police created a sense of fear especially since 
I myself am a woman and I decided along with others that we would not go out in 
opposition to the government. 
 
Many of the teachers I interviewed spoke of the violence they witnessed and how it deterred 
them from participating in further mobilizations. They felt that the local and the CNTE were 
incapable of offering any protection for its members. This fear of violence was further intensified 
in subsequent years with the state’s reorganization of the IEEPO and with the violence that took 
place in Nochixtlán in 2016. 
 Given Local 22’s weakened state following the conflict of 2006 the government exploited 
a fissure intended to further debilitate the union. Gabino Cue, the governor of Oaxaca that 
succeeded Ulises Ruiz, became the first non-PRI governor in Oaxaca in eighty years. Much of 
his success in winning the governorship in 2010 can be traced back to the conflict of 2006. 
Citizens who felt betrayed by the police violence and Ruiz’s corruption along with various 
unions throughout the state made their displeasure known at the polls. Cue won on a platform 
that promised a break from the status quo. He denounced the violence of 2006 and blamed Ruiz 
for precipitating it (Correa-Cabrera, 2013), promising to hold a tribunal to charge Ruiz of 
corruption. Cue also assured the teachers that he would establish a friendlier and more 
transparent relationship with them in order to address the many issues facing education and the 
lack of funding for schools and teachers (Saavedra, 2016). The change in regime signaled a new 
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era of promise for the teachers and Local 22. One interviewee, Roberto, expressed hope as he 
recalled the election of 2010. 
As an organizer and director of an NGO we felt a lot of what the teachers were feeling 
after the events of 2006. We thought if the government could be so brutal with teachers 
then it could certainly do the same to us, if not more. At least the teachers have the union. 
We don’t have any legal structure or presence that we can rely on for help. We were 
much more reserved and careful when we participated in events that were critical of any 
aspect of the government…When 2010 came and Cue was seen as the foil to the PRI we 
did what we could to help him get elected. There was a feeling of hope and it seemed that 
courage was starting to come back. 
 
The excitement that began to spring up was quickly doused when in 2015 Gabino Cue signed an 
executive order to reorganize the IEEPO with the intention of purging it of workers who 
belonged to local 22. The decree or decretazo as it is known among teachers was another violent 
moment coming after the events of 2006. Oscar, one of the teachers I interviewed held an 
administrative position in the IEEPO and was present the day he and other Local 22 members 
were forced out of their offices and out onto the street. 
 He described the scene as similar to what happened in the zócalo nearly four years 
earlier. The state police arrived and surrounded the entrance to the building. Armed with 
machine guns and military style vehicles the scene brought back haunting memories. Oscar 
talked about how the police entered the building and began searching for local 22 members by 
name. They had a list of the names and began to call them off one by one and escorted them 
outside. The workers had no time and were not given permission to grab their belongings. They 
had to leave everything behind and being escorted on each side by armed police officers walked 
out the front door never to step foot inside the IEEPO again. On top of being expelled from the 
IEEPO local 22 members lost their jobs. Oscar recalled how he walked outside the IEEPO that 
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day without employment and was not sure what to do. He and other administrators immediately 
contacted their union representatives to let them know what had happened. 
After we contacted the union they assured us that they would send a representative to be 
with us and that the union would get back to us about what they know and what steps to 
take. Many of us waited outside the IEEPO with police units guarding the entrance with 
guns to prevent us from going back in. The whole scene was frightening, and I had no 
idea what to expect…A representative from the union never came that day. In fact, I 
didn’t hear back from the union for four days. When I did hear from the union there was 
not much said that I didn’t already know. I wanted some assurances more than anything 
that the union was going to get my job back or at least transfer me to a new sector. They 
told me that they were in contact with the government and that the situation would be 
taken care of and my job restored…That never happened. Communication from union 
leadership was minimal. I did find employment again as an administrator at a primary 
school which the union did help me get. But many of my coworkers from the IEEPO 
have yet to be transferred to work in other sectors. We are talking about two years ago 
and many friends who by profession are teachers have not set foot in a classroom. Many 
of them have found jobs in other fields outside of teaching (Oscar, personal 
communication, August 7, 2017). 
 
Oscar and many other teachers felt like their leaders were indifferent to their struggles or were 
powerless to do anything to rectify their predicament. The effects of the IEEPO restructuring 
were twofold. First, on a structural level it greatly debilitated the union because the government 
went after and seized the union’s most powerful asset. No longer was local 22 the gatekeeper to 
public education in the state. The administrators in charge of school curriculum, logistics of 
teacher placement, and offering employment to teachers and terminating others were removed 
and new administrators hand-chosen by the government who were highly critical of local 22 
replaced them. Second, the response of local 22 to the decree created a sense of betrayal in the 
eyes of those administrators and teachers removed from the IEEPO. Oscar, along with others 
believed that the interests of the union were somewhere else and that the leadership really was 
not worried about dozens of members being intimidated by the government and losing their jobs. 
Others that believed the union lacked the influence and power necessary to pressure the 
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government to reverse its actions began to lose faith in local 22 and became wary to anything the 
leadership wanted to do. 
 Then, in 2016, another moment of brutal violence swept over the union in the city of 
Nochixtlán. As protest activity once again began to pick up especially surrounding the new 
government reforms to teaching, teachers in this city about an hour north of Oaxaca City set up a 
blockade on the highway leading to Oaxaca. The blockade had existed for a few days before 
police forces were sent down from Mexico City to clear up the highway and many residents of 
Nochixtlán, who were not teachers but supported them, were present at the blockade. One of the 
teachers present at the blockade recounts her experience witnessing the carnage that took place 
once the police arrived. 
We all knew that the police were coming from Mexico [City] from rumors and others 
relaying information about what they were seeing in Puebla. We gathered as many 
teachers and others willing to help out as possible and made preparations for their arrival. 
As the convoy of police approached some of us began to create distractions by setting 
tires on fire at the main entrance to Nochixtlán. Hundreds of police officers in riot gear 
began to form. As the tension escalated people started to say that shots were fired by the 
police. Protestors then began to set fire to vehicles located at the entrance to the city. 
There were some semi-trucks and buses that were used to create a barricade between us 
and the police. People were yelling and running from every direction and the whole scene 
was of chaos. Those that were injured by bullets or tear gas were taken into the city to be 
treated at homes and the church since the hospital would not accept any of the injured 
protestors. My principle responsibility during the conflict was to remove the cannisters of 
tear gas as soon as they were fired our way. I remember running out with my face 
covered in rags and grabbing the cannisters and throwing them back toward the police 
(Sol, personal communication, August 13, 2017). 
 
Once again, like in 2006, protestors were killed, and the police used the violence to suppress the 
movement. Some of the protestors present in Nochixtlán were also present during the moments 
of police violence in the zócalo in 2006. But the response of the union after the events of 
Nochixtlán differed drastically from its response to the violence of 2006, and this difference 
highlights the state in which the union found itself. When the police violently removed the 
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teachers from the zócalo in 2006 the reaction of the union was swift and aggressive. Tens of 
thousands of teachers assembled at the request of Local 22 to march into the city. These mega-
marches took place on various occasions in June 2006. The union publicly denounced the 
violence and vowed that justice would be sought for the victims. Local 22 also turned to the 
public for help in mobilizing the movement, which came relatively easy since the local had 
established a positive relationship with communities throughout the state. But 2016 saw a 
different response from the local. While the union did condemn the violence publicly, there was 
not much action taken. There were no mega-marches. There were no pleas to the public like in 
2006 for support in fighting against the government. In fact, there was not much of anything. 
During my time spent in Oaxaca during the summer of 2016 I did not see the same effort on the 
part of the union to demand justice as it did ten years earlier. The zócalo was not full of 
protesting teachers and it seemed that the atmosphere was one of resignation. This is not to say 
that there was no protesting that took place in the wake of Nochixtlán. While scattered, some of 
the most intense protesting took place in the Isthmus region of the state where individual 
delegations such as those in Juchitán de Zaragoza setup barricades and blocked off access to the 
major highway leading into Juchitán from Oaxaca. These isolated instances of protest highlight 
the precarious state of the union at that time since it appeared that the leadership had lost some 
measure of control over the actions of its base, highlighting the polarization felt within the union. 
  And it was not just violence that tempered the union. Administratively, some decisions 
made by the leadership of local 22 during the movement of 2006, for example, intensified a 
growing dissatisfaction among teachers. When local 22 went to the negotiating table in 
November of 2006 many within the movement felt that the momentum was in their favor and 
they wanted the conflict to continue. They felt that the movement would pressure the federal 
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government enough that it would have to acquiesce to the local’s demands that Ruiz be removed 
from office and tried in court for murder and corruption. Instead, when the leadership of local 22 
met with federal and state officials a truce was reached and the movement ended. The federal 
government sent police forces to Oaxaca and forcefully removed the protestors from the zócalo 
and Ruiz returned to govern the state (Eisenstadt, 2011). By reaching a deal behind closed doors, 
especially since the negotiation took place without the teachers’ consent and contrary to many of 
the teachers’ wishes, a feeling of betrayal grew among union members. “Many of us felt hurt by 
the delegates when we found out that they had met with the government and decided to end the 
movement. There was so much momentum on our side with APPO and other organizations 
behind us. For almost six months we had control of the city, there were no police, we ran our 
own Guelaguetza [festival]. So for them to end the movement like that felt like a stab in the back 
and many of us lost respect and a desire to fight” (Oscar, personal communication, August 7, 
2017). 
After the movement of 2006, local 22 experienced a period of weakening that stretched 
over the following ten years. It seemed that the leadership was viewed with much more scrutiny 
and a lack of faith in their motives pushed many teachers to not participate in subsequent 
marches and protests. While interviewing Divina, one of the teachers heavily invested in the 
2006 conflict, she told me that even the threat of union sanctions against teachers who refused to 
participate in marches and sit-ins was not effective. Many of the rank and file did not care and 
rumors and accusations of corruption among the leadership spread quickly. Many believed that 
the union leaders made deals with the government to exonerate themselves of any further 
prosecution. When Enrique Rueda Pacheco, the leader of Local 22 during the conflict of 2006, 
suddenly resigned from his post in 2007 and disappeared from the public eye many within the 
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union believed the government had bought him off and sent him to live overseas (Agudo 
Sanchiz, 2014). 
All of the characteristics displayed in this chapter align with Michels’ theory on 
oligarchy. The centralization of power enforced by the leaders of local 22 led to an increased 
focus on maintaining their positions of power and a decreased focus on the needs of the rank and 
file. This is why Oscar and so many others felt forgotten after their traumatic experience being 
removed from the IEEPO and fired from their positions. But the repression shows just how 
significant it can be in shaping the trajectory of an organization. Repression against local 22 set 
off a series of changes that ultimately forced the leaders to assume more control over the local. 
 
Conclusion 
 My purpose in bringing up these examples is to highlight the argument that external 
factors, more so than internal ones, pushed local 22 to become oligarchic. Government 
repression, especially, has influenced the local’s shift to oligarchy. Two of the principle reasons 
for why an organization may shift to oligarchy is to achieve an increase in effectiveness and 
efficiency in running the operations of the organization. If the organization’s members are less 
invested in the union or indifferent to its leadership then there is a decrease in solidarity and 
efficiency because the rank-and-file feels less invested and less motivated to fight for union 
causes. The leadership has to work harder to maintain the support of the base. This is the case 
with local 22. The pressure the government applied to the local disrupted its ability to operate at 
an effective level. The leadership needed to focus on surviving the onslaught of government 
attacks and one way to do this was to consolidate power to increase efficiency and maintain 
control. It is much easier to make decisions in a conference room than it is to hold public 
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assemblies and wait for the voice of the rank-and-file to tell the leadership what actions to take. 
This becomes extremely impractical when there is an oppositional force that applies near-
constant pressure on the union and important decisions regarding how to respond to that pressure 
must be made on a consistent and urgent basis. What these events help to show is the underlying 
power struggle taking place within local 22. As the local tried to weather repression and political 
struggles, the need to centralize its control became more apparent. This can be seen in the 
aftermath of the 2006 conflict and subsequent years where the actions of Local 22 were decided 
on by the leadership, many times leaving the rank and file unaware of the decisions being made 
until much later. While influential, the centralization of power and bureaucratization of local 22 
are not the main factors behind its shift to oligarchy, and it becomes increasingly clear that the 
factors behind the local’s shift to oligarchy point toward the increased repression. 
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Conclusion: Why Repression Matters and the Future of Local 22 
  
 The experience of local 22 helps to explain the role of repression as an influencing force 
behind the local’s shift to oligarchy. As the local continued to endure both political and physical 
attacks by the government it experienced an increased shift toward more centralization where the 
rank and file did not experience the same amount of decision-making power it historically 
enjoyed. By the end of the 2006 conflict, for example, the rank and file felt left out when local 22 
announced an end to the occupation of Oaxaca City, and as the years carried on, the leadership 
exercised more control over decision-making and expressed less concern for the rank and file. As 
a result, by the time of the Nochixtlán massacre in 2016, many in the rank and file felt 
disillusioned with their leaders and morale was at historic lows which helps explain why teacher 
participation in protests was so dismal. Not even the threat of union sanctions could dissuade the 
teachers from failing to participate in local 22 sponsored activities. 
 What happened in Oaxaca is important when looking at the forces that push an 
organization to become oligarchic because it adds another factor to what Michels and others have 
argued. In most cases Michels’ iron law holds true, the larger an organization—even a 
democratic one—grows the more it has to centralize power and bureaucratize in order to 
streamline the day-to-day operational decisions that need to be made. If not, then the 
organization cannot sustain itself for long and eventually the organization will become 
paralyzed, collapse, or fracture. Historically, one of the effects of bureaucratization and the 
centralization of power on a democratic organization is a weakening of its democracy. However, 
this is not true in all cases such as was explored with the Electrical Workers Union (SME) in 
Mexico. The SME is a very large union, yet it has successfully held competitive elections for 
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decades and the rank and file enjoy a great amount of power. Furthermore, the rank and file have 
been successful in maintaining a check on the union leadership, not allowing it to overreach its 
authority. Local 22 shares many of the same characteristics of the SME, and like the SME, local 
22 was able to resist a shift to oligarchy for many years. What differentiates the two 
organizations is government repression. SME has not faced the level of violence that local 22 
has. The brutal repression of 2006 and the political and economic government attacks against the 
local since then have been more than the local can weather, and it has had to adopt an oligarchic 
structure to be able to continue existing. 
 This experience shows us that to be able to better understand Michels’ theory of 
oligarchy the understanding of what factors make an organization become oligarchic needs to 
expand. Attention needs to be given to the external pressures placed on an organization, not just 
the internal ones. The example in Oaxaca exemplifies this with the government repression 
against local 22 and the repression’s effects on the local’s organization. By adding to Michels’ 
theory researchers will have more tools to understand how seemingly bottom-up and democratic 
organizations become oligarchic, when, like local 22, bureaucracy, centralization of power, and 
even corporatist relationships do not explain the oligarchization of the organization. Currently, 
many bottom-up structured labor unions face increasing violence and repression from state 
actors, and an investigation into the effects of repression on the oligarchization of unions could 
provide new insight into the study of anti-union violence, union organization, and union-state 
relations.      
The repression local 22 experienced in 2006 and in following years is not unique to 
Oaxaca, nor to Mexico. Latin America has a long history of government repression against trade 
unions and more liberal organizations. Caudillos and dictators from Argentina to Chile to 
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Mexico violently dealt with liberal trade unions and silenced many of their leaders. Since 
Mexico’s economic liberalization beginning in the 1980s, presidents have exercised less patience 
in dealing with antagonistic unions. In 2009, for example, Mexican president Felipe Calderón 
ordered members of the military and police to forcefully seize the properties of Luz y Fuerza del 
Centro (Central Light and Power), a power company in central Mexico that provides power to 
the Mexico City region. Most of the 44,000 members of Luz y Fuerza belong to the SME, which 
in addition to being one of the more democratic unions in Mexico, is also one of the most 
independent and resistant to the government (Miller, 2009). The government seizure of Luz y 
Fuerza property and assets has been the boldest move yet by the government against the SME, 
and like local 22, threatens the very existence of the union. The night the military seized the 
properties, President Calderón signed a decree to liquidate the company, fire its 44,000 workers, 
and turn the assets over to the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), the state-owned electricity 
utility. As of now no research has been done to investigate whether or not the organizational 
structure of SME was affected by the attack against Luz y Fuerza. Local 22’s experience with 
repression can help to establish a framework to see if SME follows a similar path of diminishing 
democracy and increasing oligarchy. Given all of the repression trade unions suffer from their 
respective governments it is surprising that more focus has not been placed on how repression 
affects the organizational structure of the repressed organizations. 
Time will tell whether or not local 22 re-establishes its presence and influence in Oaxaca. 
In 2016, local 22’s future seemed bleak, yet in the last two years the local has begun to show 
flashes of its former powerful self. Protest activity has begun to ramp up, bringing with it larger 
crowds of teachers participating (Briseño, 2018). The zócalo is beginning to fill with teachers 
again during the summer sit-ins, but with the new laws governing education workers, it is much 
89 
 
easier for the government to fire teachers found protesting, and since local 22 no longer controls 
the IEEPO its hands are essentially tied to prevent any kind of government sanctions against its 
members. Yet the government defiance that so well defined local 22 has started to resurface with 
the local not only staging protests and marches throughout the city but also setting up roadblocks 
throughout the state (Cruz, 2017). Much like in the past, local 22 will be testing the 
government’s patience and resilience to rebellion. Historically, local 22 has been one of the most 
tenacious and resilient locals in Mexico, withstanding repression and attacks not only from the 
government, but from other organizations and unions as well. One lingering question now is if 
the scars of 2006 have permanently crippled local 22 or if they will strengthen the teachers’ 
resiliency and embolden them as they once more go against the government. After all, the 
government has not been able, as of yet, to eradicate local 22, and as long as the spark of 
rebellion is not extinguished, Oaxaca will continue to be an ideological battleground with local 
22 at the vanguard of non-comformity.      
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